Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information, and Computing Systems. 5th International ICST Conference, BIONETICS 2010, Boston, USA, December 1-3, 2010, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Organic Resilience for Tactical Environments

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-32615-8_3,
        author={Marco Carvalho and Tom Lamkin and Carlos Perez},
        title={Organic Resilience for Tactical Environments},
        proceedings={Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information, and Computing Systems. 5th International ICST Conference, BIONETICS 2010, Boston, USA, December 1-3, 2010, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={BIONETICS},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={Organic Computing Biologically-Inspired Resilience Tactical Networks Resilient Systems Distributed Control},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-32615-8_3}
    }
    
  • Marco Carvalho
    Tom Lamkin
    Carlos Perez
    Year: 2012
    Organic Resilience for Tactical Environments
    BIONETICS
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32615-8_3
Marco Carvalho1,*, Tom Lamkin2,*, Carlos Perez1,*
  • 1: Institute for Human and Machine Cognition
  • 2: Air Force Research Laboratory
*Contact email: macarvalho@ihmc.us, thomas.lamkin@wpafb.af.mil, cperez@ihmc.us

Abstract

In this paper we present a tactical defense infrastructure for mission survivability based on three core inspirations from biological systems: multi-potentiation, feedback mechanisms, and redundancy. In tactical operational environments, these concepts may be realized through a combination of capabilities that include (1) dynamic allocation of resources for mission execution, (2) detection and identification of attacks and their effects, and (3) information sharing for system adaptation. As a proof-of-concept we introduce an extensible, multi-layer defense infrastructure inspired in the self-organization and resilience properties of biological systems. Two defense strategies are considered to validate the proposed model: a fast response consisting on rebooting a compromised system from a reference system image; and a slower response involving a process of identification of the attack, which then allows the node to change its base configuration and reboot to a state that is potentially immune to the same attack. Our experimental results show that the second strategy improves the overall resilience of the system for ongoing attacks after an initial exposure phase.