Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms

Download162 downloads
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17,
        author={Yan Chen and Onur Kesten},
        title={From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms},
        proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={AMMA},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17}
    }
    
  • Yan Chen
    Onur Kesten
    Year: 2012
    From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms
    AMMA
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17
Yan Chen1,*, Onur Kesten2,*
  • 1: University of Michigan
  • 2: Carnegie Mellon University
*Contact email: yanchen@umich.edu, okesten@andrew.cmu.edu

Abstract

School choice has been one of the most important and widely-debated education policies in the past two decades, with game theory playing a major role in the adoption of school choice mechanisms. Similarly, college admissions in China have gone through many local experimentations, with a rich variety of mechanisms used in various provinces.