Research Article
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14, author={Ron Lavi and Sigal Oren}, title={Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case}, proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={AMMA}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={ascending auctions myopic bidding signaling ex-post efficiency}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14} }
- Ron Lavi
Sigal Oren
Year: 2012
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case
AMMA
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14
Abstract
We analyze an ascending auction with anonymous item- prices, when there are two items that are substitutes. This popular auction format entails increased opportunities for bidders to coordinate bids, as the bidding process is longer, and since bidders see the other bids and can respond to various signaling. This has happened in many real auctions, e.g., in the Netherlands 3G Telecom Auction and in the FCC auctions in the US.
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