Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case

Ron Lavi; Sigal Oren

Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case

Download

445 downloads

Cite: BibTeX Plain Text

@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14,
    author={Ron Lavi and Sigal Oren},
    title={Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case},
    proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
    proceedings_a={AMMA},
    year={2012},
    month={10},
    keywords={ascending auctions myopic bidding signaling ex-post efficiency},
    doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14}
}

Ron Lavi
Sigal Oren
Year: 2012
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case
AMMA
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14

Ron Lavi¹^,*, Sigal Oren²^,*

1: Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
2: Cornell University

*Contact email: ronlavi@ie.technion.ac.il, sigal@cs.cornell.edu

Abstract

We analyze an ascending auction with anonymous item- prices, when there are two items that are substitutes. This popular auction format entails increased opportunities for bidders to coordinate bids, as the bidding process is longer, and since bidders see the other bids and can respond to various signaling. This has happened in many real auctions, e.g., in the Netherlands 3G Telecom Auction and in the FCC auctions in the US.

Keywords: ascending auctions myopic bidding signaling ex-post efficiency

Published: 2012-10-08

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_14

Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case

Abstract

About EAI

Community

Publish with EAI