Wireless Internet. 6th International ICST Conference, WICON 2011, Xi’an, China, October 19-21, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18,
        author={Yang Yan and Jianwei Huang and Ming Zhao and Jing Wang},
        title={Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users},
        proceedings={Wireless Internet. 6th International ICST Conference, WICON 2011, Xi’an, China, October 19-21, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={WICON},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={dynamic Bayesian spectrum bargaining cooperative spectrum sharing sequential equilibrium incomplete information game theory reputation effect},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18}
    }
    
  • Yang Yan
    Jianwei Huang
    Ming Zhao
    Jing Wang
    Year: 2012
    Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users
    WICON
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18
Yang Yan1,*, Jianwei Huang2,*, Ming Zhao1,*, Jing Wang1,*
  • 1: Tsinghua University
  • 2: CUHK
*Contact email: yanyang07@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, jwhuang@ie.cuhk.edu.hk, zhaoming@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, wangj@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate a cooperative spectrum sharing mechanism realized by a between a pair of primary user and secondary user. The primary user has only incomplete information of the secondary user’s energy cost. We model such a bargaining process as a dynamic Bayesian game, and discuss the equilibria under all possible system parameters. Furthermore, we discuss in details the where the plays an important role. Our analysis shows that the secondary user with a low energy cost can exploit the primary user’s lack of complete information for its own benefits.