Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31,
        author={Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags and Nicolas Christin and John Chuang},
        title={Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents},
        proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={Security Economics Game Theory Heterogeneity},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31}
    }
    
  • Benjamin Johnson
    Jens Grossklags
    Nicolas Christin
    John Chuang
    Year: 2012
    Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents
    GAMENETS
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31
Benjamin Johnson1, Jens Grossklags2, Nicolas Christin3, John Chuang1
  • 1: University of California
  • 2: Pennsylvania State University
  • 3: Carnegie Mellon University

Abstract

Motivated attackers cannot always be blocked or deterred. In the physical-world security context, examples include suicide bombers and sexual predators. In computer networks, zero-day exploits unpredictably threaten the information economy and end users. In this paper, we study the conflicting incentives of individuals to act in the light of such threats.