Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents

Benjamin Johnson; Jens Grossklags; Nicolas Christin; John Chuang

Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

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Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31,
    author={Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags and Nicolas Christin and John Chuang},
    title={Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents},
    proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2012},
    month={10},
    keywords={Security Economics Game Theory Heterogeneity},
    doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31}
}

Benjamin Johnson
Jens Grossklags
Nicolas Christin
John Chuang
Year: 2012
Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31

Benjamin Johnson¹, Jens Grossklags², Nicolas Christin³, John Chuang¹

1: University of California
2: Pennsylvania State University
3: Carnegie Mellon University

Abstract

Motivated attackers cannot always be blocked or deterred. In the physical-world security context, examples include suicide bombers and sexual predators. In computer networks, zero-day exploits unpredictably threaten the information economy and end users. In this paper, we study the conflicting incentives of individuals to act in the light of such threats.

Keywords: Security Economics Game Theory Heterogeneity

Published: 2012-10-08

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31

Nash Equilibria for Weakest Target Security Games with Heterogeneous Agents

Abstract

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