Research Article
Coalition Stability under QoS Based-Market Segmentation
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_27, author={Dominique Barth and Johanne Cohen and Loubna Echabbi and H\^{e}l\'{e}ne Cadre}, title={Coalition Stability under QoS Based-Market Segmentation}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={cooperative game Shapley value}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_27} }- Dominique Barth
Johanne Cohen
Loubna Echabbi
Hélène Cadre
Year: 2012
Coalition Stability under QoS Based-Market Segmentation
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_27
Abstract
independent sources choose their provider depending on the perceived costs associated with each provider. The perceived cost is the sum of the price and quality of service proposed by the provider coefficiented by the source sensitivity to the quality of service. The source chooses the smallest cost provider or refuses to subscribe if all the perceived costs are above her maximum admissible opportunity cost. First, we detail the market segmentation between the providers as function of the quality of service sensitivity. Then, we prove that in case where coalitions emerged and under defensive equilibria, the game characteristic function would be submodular meaning that the Shapley value would be a fair and stable way to share the grand coalition revenue.Copyright © 2011–2024 ICST
