Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Bargaining and Peering between Network Content/Coverage Providers

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_26,
        author={Guosen Feng and Jianwei Huang and Dah Chiu},
        title={Bargaining and Peering between Network Content/Coverage Providers},
        proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={Network Content Providers Content Coverage Peering Bargaining Cooperation},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_26}
    }
    
  • Guosen Feng
    Jianwei Huang
    Dah Chiu
    Year: 2012
    Bargaining and Peering between Network Content/Coverage Providers
    GAMENETS
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_26
Guosen Feng1,*, Jianwei Huang1,*, Dah Chiu1,*
  • 1: The Chinese University of Hong Kong
*Contact email: fgs009@ie.cuhk.edu.hk, jwhuang@ie.cuhk.edu.hk, dmchiu@ie.cuhk.edu.hk

Abstract

Both content quality and market coverage have significant impacts on a network content provider’s revenue. In this paper, we present a preliminary study on how providers’ cooperation and adoption of special content can affect the content quality and market coverage. We first consider a baseline case, where providers have static contents and do not cooperate. We derive the providers’ coverages based on the quality of the contents and user subscription fees. Then we consider how cooperation and content sharing can help providers to improve their revenues. The key insight is that cooperation will be desirable when the providers’ total revenue is increased and properly shared by an inter-provider financial transfer. In the case of linear advertisement functions, cooperation will happen when providers have different abilities in generating advertisement revenue and have proper subscription fees. We further consider the dynamic content case, where a provider can introduce some high quality special content for a short amount of time to attract users to switch from one provider to the other. We show that the switching cost, the valuation of content, and time discount factor all play important roles in deciding the benefit of special content.