Research Article
Designing Incentive Schemes Based on Intervention: The Case of Imperfect Monitoring
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16, author={Jaeok Park and Mihaela Schaar}, title={Designing Incentive Schemes Based on Intervention: The Case of Imperfect Monitoring}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={intervention incentive schemes slotted multiaccess communication game theory}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16} }- Jaeok Park
Mihaela Schaar
Year: 2012
Designing Incentive Schemes Based on Intervention: The Case of Imperfect Monitoring
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.
