Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness in Heterogeneous Networks. 7th International Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness, QShine 2010, and Dedicated Short Range Communications Workshop, DSRC 2010, Houston, TX, USA, November 17-19, 2010, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

A Strategy-Proof and Non-monetary Admission Control Mechanism for Wireless Access Networks

Download118 downloads
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-29222-4_13,
        author={Xiaohan Kang and Juan Jaramillo and Lei Ying},
        title={A Strategy-Proof and Non-monetary Admission Control Mechanism for Wireless Access Networks},
        proceedings={Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness in Heterogeneous Networks. 7th International Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness, QShine 2010, and Dedicated Short Range Communications Workshop, DSRC 2010, Houston, TX, USA, November 17-19, 2010, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={QSHINE},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={Auctions truth-telling admission control resource allocation},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-29222-4_13}
    }
    
  • Xiaohan Kang
    Juan Jaramillo
    Lei Ying
    Year: 2012
    A Strategy-Proof and Non-monetary Admission Control Mechanism for Wireless Access Networks
    QSHINE
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29222-4_13
Xiaohan Kang1,*, Juan Jaramillo1,*, Lei Ying1,*
  • 1: Iowa State University
*Contact email: xkang@iastate.edu, jjjarami@iastate.edu, leiying@iastate.edu

Abstract

We study admission control mechanisms for wireless access networks where (i) each user has a minimum service requirement, (ii) the capacity of the access network is limited, and (iii) the access point is not allowed to use monetary mechanisms to guarantee that users do not lie when disclosing their minimum service requirements. To guarantee truthfulness, we use auction theory to design a mechanism where users compete to be admitted into the network. We propose admission control mechanisms under which the access point intelligently allocates resources based on the announced minimum service requirements to ensure that users have no incentive to lie and the capacity constraint is fulfilled. We also prove the properties that any feasible mechanism should have.