Research Article
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_9, author={Antonio Miralles}, title={School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism}, proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={AMMA}, year={2012}, month={5}, keywords={}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_9} }- Antonio Miralles
Year: 2012
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism
AMMA
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_9
Abstract
Since Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez’s [3] work, a concern on the mechanisms used to assign children to publicly funded schools endures. Among other school districts, Boston has concentrated a lot of attention. The formerly called Boston Mechanism (BM) that was applied since 2000 has been widely criticized. Finally in 2005, the Boston Public School authority decided to replace this mechanism with the so-called Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. The present paper argues that replacing BM might not be recommendable in every case, hence providing rationale to its persistence in other municipalities such as Cambridge, MA, Denver and Minneapolis.
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