Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_1,
        author={Stefan Schneider and Pasha Shabalin and Martin Bichler},
        title={Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions},
        proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={AMMA},
        year={2012},
        month={5},
        keywords={},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_1}
    }
    
  • Stefan Schneider
    Pasha Shabalin
    Martin Bichler
    Year: 2012
    Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
    AMMA
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_1
Stefan Schneider1,*, Pasha Shabalin1,*, Martin Bichler1,*
  • 1: Technische Universität München
*Contact email: schneider@in.tum.de, shabalin@in.tum.de, bichler@in.tum.de

Abstract

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favoring iterative combinatorial auction designs. Several promising ascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual and subgradient algorithms and linear programming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBundle( 3) (Parkes and Ungar 2000), dVSV (de Vries et al. 2007) and the Ascending Proxy auction (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) result in VCG payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies the buyer submodularity condition and bidders bid straightforward, which is an expost Nash equilibrium in that case. iBEA and CreditDebit auctions (Mishra and Parkes 2007) do not even require the buyer submodularity condition and achieve the same properties for general valuations. In many situations, however, one cannot assume bidders to bid straightforward and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavior is therefore a critical issue for any application. We have conducted a large number of computational experiments to analyze the performance of NLPPA designs with respect to different bidding strategies and different valuation models. We compare the results of NLPPAs to those of the VCG auction and those of iterative combinatorial auctions with approximate linear prices, such as ALPS (Bichler et al. 2009) and the Combinatorial Clock auction (Porter et al. 2003).