Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing. 4th International Conference, CollaborateCom 2008, Orlando, FL, USA, November 13-16, 2008, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-03354-4_10,
        author={Ryan Layfield and Murat Kantarcioglu and Bhavani Thuraisingham},
        title={Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing},
        proceedings={Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing. 4th International Conference, CollaborateCom 2008, Orlando, FL, USA, November 13-16, 2008, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={COLLABORATECOM},
        year={2012},
        month={5},
        keywords={},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-03354-4_10}
    }
    
  • Ryan Layfield
    Murat Kantarcioglu
    Bhavani Thuraisingham
    Year: 2012
    Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing
    COLLABORATECOM
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03354-4_10
Ryan Layfield1,*, Murat Kantarcioglu1,*, Bhavani Thuraisingham1,*
  • 1: University of Texas at Dallas
*Contact email: layfield@utdallas.edu, muratk@utdallas.edu, bxt043000@utdallas.edu

Abstract

Assured information sharing among different organizations in a coalitional environment is an important first step in accomplishing many critical tasks. For example, different security agencies may need to share intelligence information for detecting terrorist plots. At the same, each organization participating in the assured information sharing process may have different incentives. In this paper, we explore the effects of different incentives and potential trust issues among organizations on the assured information sharing process by developing an evolutionary game theoretic framework. In addition, we provide extensive simulation analysis that illustrates the impact of various different information sharing strategies.