Research Article
Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-03354-4_10, author={Ryan Layfield and Murat Kantarcioglu and Bhavani Thuraisingham}, title={Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing}, proceedings={Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing. 4th International Conference, CollaborateCom 2008, Orlando, FL, USA, November 13-16, 2008, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={COLLABORATECOM}, year={2012}, month={5}, keywords={}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-03354-4_10} }- Ryan Layfield
Murat Kantarcioglu
Bhavani Thuraisingham
Year: 2012
Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing
COLLABORATECOM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03354-4_10
Abstract
Assured information sharing among different organizations in a coalitional environment is an important first step in accomplishing many critical tasks. For example, different security agencies may need to share intelligence information for detecting terrorist plots. At the same, each organization participating in the assured information sharing process may have different incentives. In this paper, we explore the effects of different incentives and potential trust issues among organizations on the assured information sharing process by developing an evolutionary game theoretic framework. In addition, we provide extensive simulation analysis that illustrates the impact of various different information sharing strategies.
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