Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT. Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Valencia, Spain, November 6-7, 2017, Proceedings

Research Article

A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things

Download
164 downloads
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11,
        author={Andrey Garnaev and Wade Trappe},
        title={A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things},
        proceedings={Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT. Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Valencia, Spain, November 6-7, 2017, Proceedings},
        proceedings_a={INTERIOT \& SASEIOT},
        year={2018},
        month={7},
        keywords={IoT Security Compromised devices Nash equilibrium},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11}
    }
    
  • Andrey Garnaev
    Wade Trappe
    Year: 2018
    A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things
    INTERIOT & SASEIOT
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11
Andrey Garnaev,*, Wade Trappe1,*
  • 1: Rutgers University
*Contact email: garnaev@yahoo.com, trappe@winlab.rutgers.edu

Abstract

The vast scale of the Internet of Things (IoT), combined with its heterogeneous nature involving many different types of devices and machines, could lead the IoT to be vulnerable to a variety of security threats and malicious attacks. Addressing the broad array of threats requires that different security mechanisms are deployed at appropriate locations within the broader IoT communication network. In this paper, we examine this problem by applying a resource allocation approach involving a game-theoretical framework to model: (a) an attack aimed to maximize total damage to the network, and (b) an attack aimed to compromise at least one of the devices. To evaluate the probability of a successful attack we apply a contest success function, and found the associated equilibrium strategies in closed form. Additionally, we note an interesting relationship between equilibrium strategies in security reinforcement games and OFDM transmission games under hostile jamming. A criteria is designed that allows one to determine whether an IoT controller’s resources is sufficient to protect all of the IoT devices it manages.