A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Agents

Farzaneh Farhadi; Hamidreza Tavafoghi; Demosthenis Teneketzis; Jamal Golestani

Game Theory for Networks. 7th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2017 Knoxville, TN, USA, May 9, 2017, Proceedings

Research Article

A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Agents

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8,
    author={Farzaneh Farhadi and Hamidreza Tavafoghi and Demosthenis Teneketzis and Jamal Golestani},
    title={A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Agents},
    proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 7th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2017 Knoxville, TN, USA, May 9, 2017, Proceedings},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2017},
    month={9},
    keywords={Security games Dynamic mechanism design Epidemics over networks},
    doi={10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8}
}

Farzaneh Farhadi
Hamidreza Tavafoghi
Demosthenis Teneketzis
Jamal Golestani
Year: 2017
A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Agents
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8

Farzaneh Farhadi^,*, Hamidreza Tavafoghi¹^,*, Demosthenis Teneketzis¹^,*, Jamal Golestani²^,*

1: University of Michigan
2: Sharif University of Technology

*Contact email: ffarhadi@umich.edu, tava@umich.edu, teneket@umich.edu, golestani@ieee.org

Abstract

We study a dynamic mechanism design problem for a network of interdependent strategic agents with coupled dynamics. In contrast to the existing results for static settings, we present a dynamic mechanism that is incentive compatible, individually rational, budget balanced, and social welfare maximizing. We utilize the correlation among agents’ states over time, and determine a set of for all agents that enable us to design a set of incentive payments that internalize the effect of each agent on the overall network dynamic status, and thus, align each agent’s objective with the social objective.

Keywords: Security games Dynamic mechanism design Epidemics over networks

Published: 2017-09-19
Appears in: SpringerLink

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8