Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game

Amina Boukoftane; Eitan Altman; Majed Haddad; Nadia Oukid

Game Theory for Networks. 7th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2017 Knoxville, TN, USA, May 9, 2017, Proceedings

Research Article

Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_15,
    author={Amina Boukoftane and Eitan Altman and Majed Haddad and Nadia Oukid},
    title={Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game},
    proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 7th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2017 Knoxville, TN, USA, May 9, 2017, Proceedings},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2017},
    month={9},
    keywords={Routing game Multi-objective problem Lossy links Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy Paradox},
    doi={10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_15}
}

Amina Boukoftane
Eitan Altman
Majed Haddad
Nadia Oukid
Year: 2017
Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_15

Amina Boukoftane¹, Eitan Altman^,*, Majed Haddad², Nadia Oukid¹

1: University of Blida 1
2: LIA/CERI, University of Avignon, Agroparc

*Contact email: eitan.altman@inria.fr

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a routing game in a network that contains lossy links. We consider a multi-objective problem where the players have each a weighted sum of a delay cost and a cost for losses. We compute the equilibrium and optimal solution (which are unique). We discover here in addition to the classical Kameda type paradox another paradoxical behavior in which higher loss rates have a positive impact on delay and therefore higher quality links may cause a worse performance even in the case of a single player.

Keywords: Routing game Multi-objective problem Lossy links Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy Paradox

Published: 2017-09-19
Appears in: SpringerLink

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_15