Research Article
A Mechanism Design Approach for Influence Maximization
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_6, author={Michael Levet and Siddharth Krishnan}, title={A Mechanism Design Approach for Influence Maximization}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 6th International Conference, GameNets 2016, Kelowna, BC, Canada, May 11-12, 2016, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2017}, month={1}, keywords={Social networks Mechanism design Influence maximization Agents Game theory}, doi={10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_6} }- Michael Levet
Siddharth Krishnan
Year: 2017
A Mechanism Design Approach for Influence Maximization
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_6
Abstract
With the proliferation of online social networks (OSNs), the characterization of diffusion processes and influence maximization over such processes is a problem of relevance and importance. Although several algorithmic frameworks for identifying influential nodes exist in literature, there is a paucity of literature in the setting of competitive influence. In this paper, we present a novel mechanism design approach to study the initial seeding problem where the agents, represented by vertices in the social network, are economically rational. The principals compete for influence in the network by setting price and incentives to illicit high degree initial subscribers, which in turn profit by infecting their neighbors. We restrict attention to equilibrium strategies and comparative statics for the agents.
