Research Article
Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20, author={Lei Yang and Fengjun Li}, title={Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 11th International Conference, SecureComm 2015, Dallas, TX, USA, October 26-29, 2015, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2016}, month={2}, keywords={Tor Hidden services Anonymity network Privacy Multipath routing Watermarking attack}, doi={10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20} }- Lei Yang
Fengjun Li
Year: 2016
Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20
Abstract
Hidden service is a very important feature of Tor, which supports server operators to provide a variety of Internet services without revealing their locations. A large number of users rely on Tor hidden services to protect their anonymity. Around 30,000 servers are running hidden services every day [21]. However, hidden services are particularly vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks especially when the entry guard of a hidden server is compromised by an adversary. In this paper, we propose a multipath routing scheme for Tor hidden servers (TorHS) to defend against traffic analysis attacks. By transferring data through multiple circuits between the hidden server and a special server rendezvous point (SRP), TorHS is able to exploit flow splitting and flow merging to eliminate inter-cell correlations of the original flow. Experiments on the Shadow simulator [11] show that our scheme can effectively mitigate the risk of traffic analysis even when robust watermarking techniques are used.