Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 11th International Conference, SecureComm 2015, Dallas, TX, USA, October 26-29, 2015, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20,
        author={Lei Yang and Fengjun Li},
        title={Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing},
        proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 11th International Conference, SecureComm 2015, Dallas, TX, USA, October 26-29, 2015, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={SECURECOMM},
        year={2016},
        month={2},
        keywords={Tor Hidden services Anonymity network Privacy Multipath routing Watermarking attack},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20}
    }
    
  • Lei Yang
    Fengjun Li
    Year: 2016
    Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing
    SECURECOMM
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20
Lei Yang1,*, Fengjun Li1,*
  • 1: The University of Kansas
*Contact email: lei.yang@ku.edu, fli@ku.edu

Abstract

Hidden service is a very important feature of Tor, which supports server operators to provide a variety of Internet services without revealing their locations. A large number of users rely on Tor hidden services to protect their anonymity. Around 30,000 servers are running hidden services every day [21]. However, hidden services are particularly vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks especially when the entry guard of a hidden server is compromised by an adversary. In this paper, we propose a multipath routing scheme for Tor hidden servers (TorHS) to defend against traffic analysis attacks. By transferring data through multiple circuits between the hidden server and a special server rendezvous point (SRP), TorHS is able to exploit flow splitting and flow merging to eliminate inter-cell correlations of the original flow. Experiments on the Shadow simulator [11] show that our scheme can effectively mitigate the risk of traffic analysis even when robust watermarking techniques are used.