Research Article
Uranine: Real-time Privacy Leakage Monitoring without System Modification for Android
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_14, author={Vaibhav Rastogi and Zhengyang Qu and Jedidiah McClurg and Yinzhi Cao and Yan Chen}, title={Uranine: Real-time Privacy Leakage Monitoring without System Modification for Android}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 11th International Conference, SecureComm 2015, Dallas, TX, USA, October 26-29, 2015, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2016}, month={2}, keywords={}, doi={10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_14} }- Vaibhav Rastogi
Zhengyang Qu
Jedidiah McClurg
Yinzhi Cao
Yan Chen
Year: 2016
Uranine: Real-time Privacy Leakage Monitoring without System Modification for Android
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_14
Abstract
Mobile devices are becoming increasingly popular. One reason for their popularity is the availability of a wide range of third-party applications, which enrich the environment and increase usability. There are however privacy concerns centered around these applications – users do not know what private data is leaked by the applications. Previous works to detect privacy leakages are either not accurate enough or require operating system changes, which may not be possible due to users’ lack of skills or locked devices. We present Uranine (Uranine is a dye, which finds applications as a flow tracer in medicine and environmental studies.), a system that instruments Android applications to detect privacy leakages in real-time. Uranine does not require any platform modification nor does it need the application source code. We designed several mechanisms to overcome the challenges of tracking information flow across framework code, handling callback functions, and expressing all information-flow tracking at the bytecode level. Our evaluation of Uranine shows that it is accurate at detecting privacy leaks and has acceptable performance overhead.
