Research Article
Improving the Security of the HMQV Protocol Using Tamper-Proof Hardware
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_24, author={Qianying Zhang and Shijun Zhao and Yu Qin and Dengguo Feng}, title={Improving the Security of the HMQV Protocol Using Tamper-Proof Hardware}, proceedings={International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 10th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2014, Beijing, China, September 24-26, 2014, Revised Selected Papers, Part I}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2015}, month={11}, keywords={Authenticated Key Exchange Full PFS Tamper-Proof hardware Physical assumption HMQV CK model}, doi={10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_24} }- Qianying Zhang
Shijun Zhao
Yu Qin
Dengguo Feng
Year: 2015
Improving the Security of the HMQV Protocol Using Tamper-Proof Hardware
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_24
Abstract
The full Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is an important security property for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols. Unfortunately, Krawczyk has claimed that any one-round implicitly authenticated key exchange protocol could not achieve full PFS but only weak PFS. Although some solutions are proposed in the literature, their protocols maintain secure only in the cases of additional authentication and a constrained adversary. In this paper, we investigate the question of whether tamper-proof hardware can circumvent the full PFS deficiency of one-round implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols. We answer this question in the affirmative by formally proving that the most efficient one-round implicitly authenticated key exchange protocol, HMQV, achieves full PFS under the physical assumption of regarding the existence of tamper-proof hardware.