Research Article
Keep the Fakes Out: Defending Against Sybil Attack in P2P Systems
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_14, author={Kan Chen and Peidong Zhu and Yueshan Xiong}, title={Keep the Fakes Out: Defending Against Sybil Attack in P2P Systems}, proceedings={International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 10th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2014, Beijing, China, September 24-26, 2014, Revised Selected Papers, Part I}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2015}, month={11}, keywords={Sybil attack Detection Social relation P2P system}, doi={10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_14} }- Kan Chen
Peidong Zhu
Yueshan Xiong
Year: 2015
Keep the Fakes Out: Defending Against Sybil Attack in P2P Systems
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_14
Abstract
Sybil attack is one of the major threats in distributed systems. A number of colluded Sybil peers can pollute and disrupt the system’s key functions. The main idea of defense against Sybil attack is to distinguish the Sybils according to specific rules. Prior works are all limited by attack edges, the connections between normal and Sybil peers. The problem is that the number of attack edges could be huge, resulting in low accuracies. Besides, Sybil peers always present in groups and bring about the bridge problem, which is always ignored. In this paper, we propose KFOut, a light weighted framework for Sybil detection. At the heart of KFOut lie a trust model of social relations and a security mechanism of path notification of K-different paths, which can conquer the bridge problem effectively. We prove through experiments that KFOut can accept normal peers and reject Sybil peers both with high accuracies.