Research Article
The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18, author={Mehari Msgna and Konstantinos Markantonakis and Keith Mayes}, title={The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 9th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2013, Sydney, NSW, Australia, September 25-28, 2013, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2014}, month={6}, keywords={Side Channel Leakage Power Consumption Program’s Control Flow Hidden Markov Model Principal Components Analysis Linear Discriminant Analysis}, doi={10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18} }- Mehari Msgna
Konstantinos Markantonakis
Keith Mayes
Year: 2014
The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18
Abstract
The security of an embedded system is often compromised when a “trusted” program is subverted to behave differently. Such as executing maliciously crafted code and/or skipping legitimate parts of a “trusted” program. Several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature to counteract these behavioural changes of a program. A common underlying theme in most of them is to define security policies at the lower level of the system in an independent manner and then check for security violations either statically or dynamically at runtime. In this paper we propose a novel method that verifies a program’s behaviour, such as the control flow, by using the device’s side channel leakage.
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