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Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 19th EAI International Conference, SecureComm 2023, Hong Kong, China, October 19-21, 2023, Proceedings, Part II

Research Article

Analyzing Implementation-Based SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities with Binary Semantics Analysis

Cite
BibTeX Plain Text
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_19,
        author={Li Wang and Yi Yang and Goutham Reddy Alavalapati},
        title={Analyzing Implementation-Based SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities with Binary Semantics Analysis},
        proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 19th EAI International Conference, SecureComm 2023, Hong Kong, China, October 19-21, 2023, Proceedings, Part II},
        proceedings_a={SECURECOMM PART 2},
        year={2024},
        month={10},
        keywords={SSL/TLS vulnerability Program vulnerability analysis Binary semantics analysis Binary similarity comparison Symbolic execution Dynamic analysis},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_19}
    }
    
  • Li Wang
    Yi Yang
    Goutham Reddy Alavalapati
    Year: 2024
    Analyzing Implementation-Based SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities with Binary Semantics Analysis
    SECURECOMM PART 2
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_19
Li Wang1,*, Yi Yang2, Goutham Reddy Alavalapati1
  • 1: Fontbonne University
  • 2: Northeastern Illinois University
*Contact email: lwang@fontbonne.edu

Abstract

SSL/TLS are cryptographic protocols created to protect the security and privacy over computer network communication. As a critical security infrastructure on the internet, it has been widely used for decades in various network related applications, such as HTTPs, SMTPs, FTPs, and so on. Although it is designed to “protect” the network communication, it also has some security concerns. In this paper, we present the feasibility of analyzing implementation-based SSL/TLS vulnerabilities with binary semantics analysis. We use a basic-blocks-sequence based binary semantics comparison method to conduct vulnerability analysis on SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. We abstract a vulnerability execution trace as a “signature”. By comparing the semantic similarity of a target program’s execution trace and a vulnerability’s “signature”, we are able to detect whether the target program contains the vulnerability or not. We analyzed the well-known Heartbleed vulnerability and other implementation based vulnerabilities in representative network applications which use two popular SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and mbedTLS. The evaluation result shows that our basic-blocks-sequence based binary semantics comparison method is effective on analyzing the existence of various implementation based SSL/TLS vulnerabilities.

Keywords
SSL/TLS vulnerability Program vulnerability analysis Binary semantics analysis Binary similarity comparison Symbolic execution Dynamic analysis
Published
2024-10-15
Appears in
SpringerLink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_19
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