Research Article
A Game Theoretical Analysis of Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense Incentive
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_1, author={Mingwei Zhang and Jun Li and Jiabin Wu and Peter Reiher}, title={A Game Theoretical Analysis of Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense Incentive}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 19th EAI International Conference, SecureComm 2023, Hong Kong, China, October 19-21, 2023, Proceedings, Part II}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM PART 2}, year={2024}, month={10}, keywords={DDoS DDoS defense in-network DDoS defense DDoS defense incentive}, doi={10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_1} }- Mingwei Zhang
Jun Li
Jiabin Wu
Peter Reiher
Year: 2024
A Game Theoretical Analysis of Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense Incentive
SECURECOMM PART 2
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_1
Abstract
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are becoming more frequent and powerful. Traditionaledge defensesolutions can no longer keep up, andin-network defensesolutions are needed that involve multiple Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to collaboratively defend against the attacks. While collaborative defense solutions are technically more effective at stopping large-scale attacks, the incentives for ISPs to deploy these solutions remain unexplored. In this study, we develop a game theoretic model to capture the economic benefits and costs of deployment for ISPs competing for customers. Through large-scale simulations at the Internet level, we find that the majority of ISPs on the Internet have an economic incentive to participate in DDoS defense, driven by competition; and that the severity of DDoS attacks and the level of competition affect an ISP’s charge for filtering DDoS traffic for its customers.
