Research Article
HoneyBreath: An Ambush Tactic Against Wireless Breath Inference
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-031-34776-4_12, author={Qiuye He and Edwin Yang and Song Fang and Shangqing Zhao}, title={HoneyBreath: An Ambush Tactic Against Wireless Breath Inference}, proceedings={Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking and Services. 19th EAI International Conference, MobiQuitous 2022, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, November 14-17, 2022, Proceedings}, proceedings_a={MOBIQUITOUS}, year={2023}, month={6}, keywords={Breathing rate inference Deceptive communication Anti-eavesdropping Channel state information}, doi={10.1007/978-3-031-34776-4_12} }- Qiuye He
Edwin Yang
Song Fang
Shangqing Zhao
Year: 2023
HoneyBreath: An Ambush Tactic Against Wireless Breath Inference
MOBIQUITOUS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-34776-4_12
Abstract
Breathing rates can be used to verify the human presence and disclose a person’s physiological status. Many studies have demonstrated success in applying channel state information (CSI) to infer breathing rates. Due to the invisibility of radio signals, the ubiquitous deployment of wireless infrastructures, and the elimination of the line-of-sight (LOS) requirement, such wireless inference techniques can surreptitiously work and violate user privacy. However, little research has been conducted specifically in mitigating misuse of those techniques. In this paper, we discover a new type of proactive countermeasures against all existing CSI-based vital signs inference techniques. Specifically, we set up ambush locations with carefully designed wireless signals, where eavesdroppers infer a fake breathing rate specified by the transmitter. The true breathing rate is thus protected. Experimental results on software-defined radio platforms show with the proposed defenses, the eavesdropper is no longer able to infer breathing rates accurately using CSI, and would be fooled by a fake one crafted by the transmitter instead.
