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Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing. 18th EAI International Conference, CollaborateCom 2022, Hangzhou, China, October 15-16, 2022, Proceedings, Part I

Research Article

Incentive Mechanism Design for Uncertain Tasks in Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems Utilizing Smart Contract in Blockchain

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-031-24383-7_26,
        author={Xikun Jiang and Chenhao Ying and Xinchun Yu and Boris D\'{y}dder and Yuan Luo},
        title={Incentive Mechanism Design for Uncertain Tasks in Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems Utilizing Smart Contract in Blockchain},
        proceedings={Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing. 18th EAI International Conference, CollaborateCom 2022, Hangzhou, China, October 15-16, 2022, Proceedings, Part I},
        proceedings_a={COLLABORATECOM},
        year={2023},
        month={1},
        keywords={Incentive mechanism Uncertain sensing tasks Mobile crowd sensing Smart contract},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-031-24383-7_26}
    }
    
  • Xikun Jiang
    Chenhao Ying
    Xinchun Yu
    Boris Düdder
    Yuan Luo
    Year: 2023
    Incentive Mechanism Design for Uncertain Tasks in Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems Utilizing Smart Contract in Blockchain
    COLLABORATECOM
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-24383-7_26
Xikun Jiang1, Chenhao Ying1, Xinchun Yu2, Boris Düdder3, Yuan Luo1,*
  • 1: Department of Computer Science and Engineering
  • 2: Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute
  • 3: Department of Computer Science
*Contact email: yuanluo@sjtu.edu.cn

Abstract

Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems recently have been regarded as a newly-emerged sensing paradigm, where the platform receives the requested tasks from requesters and outsources the collection of sensory data to participating workers. However, the centralized structure of the MCS system is vulnerable to a single point of failure, and there is a lack of trust between participants and the platform. Additionally, participating in MCS is often costly. So the paramount problem is how to solve these problems associated with centralized structures and incentivize more participation. Most existing works design the incentive mechanisms only considering static sensing tasks whose information is completely known a priori (e.g.,when and which task arrives). Due to the dynamic environment and severe resource constraints, the tasks are usually uncertain,i.e.,the information of tasks is incompletely known by the platform. Therefore, in this paper, we design an incentive mechanism, HERALD, for the uncertain tasks in MCS systems by using smart contracts. Specifically, the uncertain tasks are low sensitive to time (that is, tasks do not require real-time information) and arrive according to a probability distribution. HERALD utilizes the decentralized nature of the blockchain to eliminate the system’s reliance on third parties and satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality, as well as low computational complexity and low social cost. The desirable properties of HERALD are validated through both theoretical analysis and extensive simulations.

Keywords
Incentive mechanism Uncertain sensing tasks Mobile crowd sensing Smart contract
Published
2023-01-25
Appears in
SpringerLink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24383-7_26
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