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Game Theory for Networks. 11th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2022, Virtual Event, July 7–8, 2022, Proceedings

Research Article

A Sophisticated Anti-jamming Strategy for a Joint Radar and Communication System

Cite
BibTeX Plain Text
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-031-23141-4_5,
        author={Andrey Garnaev and Wade Trappe},
        title={A Sophisticated Anti-jamming Strategy for a Joint Radar and Communication System},
        proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 11th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2022, Virtual Event, July 7--8, 2022, Proceedings},
        proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
        year={2023},
        month={1},
        keywords={Nash equilibrium Radar Communication Jamming},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-031-23141-4_5}
    }
    
  • Andrey Garnaev
    Wade Trappe
    Year: 2023
    A Sophisticated Anti-jamming Strategy for a Joint Radar and Communication System
    GAMENETS
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-23141-4_5
Andrey Garnaev1,*, Wade Trappe1
  • 1: WINLAB
*Contact email: garnaev@yahoo.com

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of determining how a joint (dual) radar and communication system should divide its effort between supporting its radar and communication tasks in the presence of a jammer that wants to obstruct the system’s work by means of jamming. The system, besides the basic objective consisting of two tasks (a) to communicate with a receiver and (b) to track a radar target through the reflections witnessed at the system, also has the secondary objective to achieve the basic objective in a manner that is as unpredictable as possible to the jammer. The signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) of the radar and communication’s SINR are considered as the metrics that reflect the radar and communication tasks, respectively. The entropy associated with a system’s strategy to switch between two tasks is considered as a metric that reflects unpredictability of its strategy for the jammer. We model this problem by a Bayesian game for a scenario where the system is at a disadvantage to access information about environmental parameters relative to the jammer. The established uniqueness of the equilibrium reflects stability of the designed anti-jamming strategy, even in such a disadvantageous situation for the system.

Keywords
Nash equilibrium Radar Communication Jamming
Published
2023-01-08
Appears in
SpringerLink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23141-4_5
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