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Applied Cryptography in Computer and Communications. Second EAI International Conference, AC3 2022, Virtual Event, May 14-15, 2022, Proceedings

Research Article

The Block-Based Mobile PDE Systems are Not Secure - Experimental Attacks

Cite
BibTeX Plain Text
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-031-17081-2_9,
        author={Niusen Chen and Bo Chen and Weisong Shi},
        title={The Block-Based Mobile PDE Systems are Not Secure - Experimental Attacks},
        proceedings={Applied Cryptography in Computer and Communications. Second EAI International Conference, AC3 2022, Virtual Event, May 14-15, 2022, Proceedings},
        proceedings_a={AC3},
        year={2022},
        month={10},
        keywords={PDE Coercive attacks NAND flash Deniability compromises Experimental attacks},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-031-17081-2_9}
    }
    
  • Niusen Chen
    Bo Chen
    Weisong Shi
    Year: 2022
    The Block-Based Mobile PDE Systems are Not Secure - Experimental Attacks
    AC3
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-17081-2_9
Niusen Chen1, Bo Chen1,*, Weisong Shi1
  • 1: Department of Computer Science
*Contact email: bchen@mtu.edu

Abstract

Nowadays, mobile devices have been used broadly to store and process sensitive data. To ensure confidentiality of the sensitive data, Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is often integrated in mainstream mobile operating systems like Android and iOS. FDE however cannot defend against coercive attacks in which the adversary can force the device owner to disclose the decryption key. To combat the coercive attacks, Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) is leveraged to plausibly deny the very existence of sensitive data. However, most of the existing PDE systems for mobile devices are deployed at the block layer and suffer from deniability compromises.

Having observed that none of existing works in the literature have experimentally demonstrated the aforementioned compromises, our work bridges this gap by experimentally confirming the deniability compromises of the block-layer mobile PDE systems. We have built a mobile device testbed, which consists of a host computing device and a flash storage device. Additionally, we have deployed both the hidden volume-based PDE and the steganographic file system-based PDE at the block layer of our testbed and performed disk forensics to assess potential compromises on the raw NAND flash. Our experimental results confirm it is indeed possible for the adversary to compromise the block-layer PDE systems when the adversary can have access to the raw NAND flash in real world. We also discuss practical issues when performing such attacks in practice.

Keywords
PDE Coercive attacks NAND flash Deniability compromises Experimental attacks
Published
2022-10-06
Appears in
SpringerLink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17081-2_9
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