Research Article
Survey on Bridge Discovery in Tor
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_23, author={Fucai Yu and Ruoshui Zhou and Xuemeng Zhai and Youyang Qu and Gaolei Fei}, title={Survey on Bridge Discovery in Tor}, proceedings={Ad Hoc Networks and Tools for IT. 13th EAI International Conference, ADHOCNETS 2021, Virtual Event, December 6--7, 2021, and 16th EAI International Conference, TRIDENTCOM 2021, Virtual Event, November 24, 2021, Proceedings}, proceedings_a={ADHOCNETS \& TRIDENTCOM}, year={2022}, month={3}, keywords={Tor networks Bridge Tor relay nodes}, doi={10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_23} }- Fucai Yu
Ruoshui Zhou
Xuemeng Zhai
Youyang Qu
Gaolei Fei
Year: 2022
Survey on Bridge Discovery in Tor
ADHOCNETS & TRIDENTCOM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_23
Abstract
To prevent users from using Tor for anonymous communication, many regulatory agencies have blocked the IP addresses of public Tor routers in Tor networks, resulting in the interception of traffic to Tor public routers. Existing research solves this problem by introducing bridge nodes into the Tor network to avoid supervision: The bridge node is usually the entrance node of the Tor network, and its information is not completely public on the network, so it cannot be intercepted completely. This allows anonymous users to access the Tor network through the bridge node, which can effectively avoid Tor censorship. Nevertheless, many studies still focus on the discovery of Tor bridge nodes. The technology of bridge node discovery in Tor networks within recent years is summarized in this paper.
