
Research Article
Dynamic Ephemeral and Session Key Generation Protocol for Next Generation Smart Grids
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_14, author={Vincent Omollo Nyangaresi and Zaid Ameen Abduljabbar and Mustafa A. Al Sibahee and Enas Wahab Abood and Iman Qays Abduljaleel}, title={Dynamic Ephemeral and Session Key Generation Protocol for Next Generation Smart Grids}, proceedings={Ad Hoc Networks and Tools for IT. 13th EAI International Conference, ADHOCNETS 2021, Virtual Event, December 6--7, 2021, and 16th EAI International Conference, TRIDENTCOM 2021, Virtual Event, November 24, 2021, Proceedings}, proceedings_a={ADHOCNETS \& TRIDENTCOM}, year={2022}, month={3}, keywords={Attacks Authentication Privacy Protocols Security Smart grids Smart meters}, doi={10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_14} }
- Vincent Omollo Nyangaresi
Zaid Ameen Abduljabbar
Mustafa A. Al Sibahee
Enas Wahab Abood
Iman Qays Abduljaleel
Year: 2022
Dynamic Ephemeral and Session Key Generation Protocol for Next Generation Smart Grids
ADHOCNETS & TRIDENTCOM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_14
Abstract
Smart grid networks offer two-way communication between the smart meters and the utility service providers (USPs). This enables the USPs to analyze real-time data emanating from the consumers and offer dynamic adjustments to the power generation and transmission. However, the periodical transmission of consumption reports from the smart meters towards the USPs over public channels exposes the exchanged messages to attacks such as eavesdropping, modification and bogus injections. Consequently, the power adjustments executed may not be occasioned by consumer requirements but by malicious entities within the smart grid network. To curb this, numerous schemes have been presented in literature. However, majority of these protocols are either susceptible to attacks or are inefficient. In this paper, a dynamic ephemeral and session key generation protocol is presented. The security analysis shows that if offers entity anonymity, mutual authentication, forward key secrecy and untraceability. In addition, it is shown to be resilient against typical smart grid attacks such as offline password guessing, denial of service (DoS), packet replays, privileged insider, man-in-the-middle (MitM), impersonation and physical capture. In terms of performance, it has the least execution times and bandwidth requirements among other related protocols.