About | Contact Us | Register | Login
ProceedingsSeriesJournalsSearchEAI
Applied Cryptography in Computer and Communications. First EAI International Conference, AC3 2021, Virtual Event, May 15-16, 2021, Proceedings

Research Article

Efficient and Private Divisible Double Auction in Trusted Execution Environment

Download(Requires a free EAI acccount)
2 downloads
Cite
BibTeX Plain Text
  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-80851-8_6,
        author={Bingyu Liu and Shangyu Xie and Yuan Hong},
        title={Efficient and Private Divisible Double Auction in Trusted Execution Environment},
        proceedings={Applied Cryptography in Computer and Communications. First EAI International Conference, AC3 2021, Virtual Event, May 15-16, 2021, Proceedings},
        proceedings_a={AC3},
        year={2021},
        month={7},
        keywords={Secure computation Auction mechanism design TEE},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-030-80851-8_6}
    }
    
  • Bingyu Liu
    Shangyu Xie
    Yuan Hong
    Year: 2021
    Efficient and Private Divisible Double Auction in Trusted Execution Environment
    AC3
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-80851-8_6
Bingyu Liu1, Shangyu Xie1, Yuan Hong1,*
  • 1: Department of Computer Science
*Contact email: yuan.hong@iit.edu

Abstract

Auction mechanisms for exchanging divisible resources (e.g., electricity, cloud resources, and network bandwidth) among distributed agents have been extensively studied. In particular, divisible double auction allows both buyers and sellers to dynamically submit their prices until convergence. However, severe privacy concerns may arise in the double auctions since all the agents may have to disclose their sensitive data such as the bid profiles (i.e., bid amounts and prices in different iterations) to other agents for resource allocation. To address such concerns, we propose an efficient and private auction systemETAby co-designing the divisible double auction mechanism with the Intel SGX, which executes the computation for auction while ensuring confidentiality and integrity for the buyers/sellers’ sensitive data. Furthermore,ETAseals the bid profiles to achieve a Progressive Second Price (PSP) auction for optimally allocating divisible resources while ensuring truthfulness with a Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we conduct experiments to validate the performance of private auction systemETA.

Keywords
Secure computation Auction mechanism design TEE
Published
2021-07-05
Appears in
SpringerLink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80851-8_6
Copyright © 2021–2025 ICST
EBSCOProQuestDBLPDOAJPortico
EAI Logo

About EAI

  • Who We Are
  • Leadership
  • Research Areas
  • Partners
  • Media Center

Community

  • Membership
  • Conference
  • Recognition
  • Sponsor Us

Publish with EAI

  • Publishing
  • Journals
  • Proceedings
  • Books
  • EUDL