Research Article
Highly Reliable PUFs for Embedded Systems, Protected Against Tampering
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-77424-0_14, author={Jean-Luc Danger and Sylvain Guilley and Michael Pehl and Sophiane Senni and Youssef Souissi}, title={Highly Reliable PUFs for Embedded Systems, Protected Against Tampering}, proceedings={Industrial Networks and Intelligent Systems. 7th EAI International Conference, INISCOM 2021, Hanoi, Vietnam, April 22-23, 2021, Proceedings}, proceedings_a={INISCOM}, year={2021}, month={5}, keywords={Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) Loop PUF Internet-of-Things (IoT) Dependability Anti-copy Root-of-Trust Tamper-Proof}, doi={10.1007/978-3-030-77424-0_14} }- Jean-Luc Danger
Sylvain Guilley
Michael Pehl
Sophiane Senni
Youssef Souissi
Year: 2021
Highly Reliable PUFs for Embedded Systems, Protected Against Tampering
INISCOM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-77424-0_14
Abstract
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are well-known to be solutions for silicon-level anti-copy applications. However, as they are sensitive components, they are the obvious target of physical attacks. Thus, they shall be well protected. In this work we discuss the use case of key generation with a Loop PUF. We discuss the Loop PUF’s efficiency and efficacy. We analyze it with respect to several known attacks like side-channel and machine learning attacks, and show that in all considered cases it either natively resists or can be protected. We also show that perturbation attempts should be within the scope of likely attacks, hence the PUF shall be protected against tampering attacks as well. Also for this attack scenario we highlight the salient features of the Loop PUF and explain how its mode of operation natively empowers it to resist such attacks.
