Research Article
A Verifiable Combinatorial Auction with Bidder’s Privacy Protection
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-66922-5_27, author={Mingwu Zhang and Bingruolan Zhou}, title={A Verifiable Combinatorial Auction with Bidder’s Privacy Protection}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in New Computing Environments. Third EAI International Conference, SPNCE 2020, Lyngby, Denmark, August 6-7, 2020, Proceedings}, proceedings_a={SPNCE}, year={2021}, month={1}, keywords={Privacy-preserving Combinatorial auction}, doi={10.1007/978-3-030-66922-5_27} }- Mingwu Zhang
Bingruolan Zhou
Year: 2021
A Verifiable Combinatorial Auction with Bidder’s Privacy Protection
SPNCE
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-66922-5_27
Abstract
Combinatorial auctions are employed in many fields such as spectrum auction and energy auction. However, data concerning bidders’ bid and bundle might reveal sensitive information, such as personal preference and competitive relation. In order to solve this problem, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction scheme to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correctness of the result. In our scheme, we employ a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect each bidder’s bid, so that the auctioneer is able to pick out the largest bid without disclosing any information about bids. Moreover, we convert the question of judging whether a bidder is a winner to the question of judging whether the vector product is 0. In our scheme, crypto service provider (CSP) is responsible for key distribution and blind signature to verify the authenticity and correctness of the result. Besides, we put forward a privacy-preserving and verifiable payment determination model to compute the payment the winner should pay.
