Research Article
A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-63086-7_14, author={Zhifan Xu and Melike Baykal-G\'{y}rsoy}, title={A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 16th EAI International Conference, SecureComm 2020, Washington, DC, USA, October 21-23, 2020, Proceedings, Part I}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2020}, month={12}, keywords={Non-zero sum game Cooperative jamming Physical layer security Incomplete channel state information}, doi={10.1007/978-3-030-63086-7_14} }- Zhifan Xu
Melike Baykal-Gürsoy
Year: 2020
A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-63086-7_14
Abstract
Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while the eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero sum game between the network defender and the eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to baseline strategies.
