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Communications and Networking. 14th EAI International Conference, ChinaCom 2019, Shanghai, China, November 29 – December 1, 2019, Proceedings, Part I

Research Article

Price-Based Power Control in NOMA Based Cognitive Radio Networks Using Stackelberg Game

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-030-41114-5_44,
        author={Zhengqiang Wang and Hongjia Zhang and Zifu Fan and Xiaoyu Wan and Xiaoxia Yang},
        title={Price-Based Power Control in NOMA Based Cognitive Radio Networks Using Stackelberg Game},
        proceedings={Communications and Networking. 14th EAI International Conference, ChinaCom 2019, Shanghai, China, November 29 -- December 1, 2019, Proceedings, Part I},
        proceedings_a={CHINACOM},
        year={2020},
        month={2},
        keywords={Non-orthogonal multiple access Cognitive radio network Successive interference cancellation Stackelberg game},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-030-41114-5_44}
    }
    
  • Zhengqiang Wang
    Hongjia Zhang
    Zifu Fan
    Xiaoyu Wan
    Xiaoxia Yang
    Year: 2020
    Price-Based Power Control in NOMA Based Cognitive Radio Networks Using Stackelberg Game
    CHINACOM
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-41114-5_44
Zhengqiang Wang1,*, Hongjia Zhang1, Zifu Fan2, Xiaoyu Wan2, Xiaoxia Yang1
  • 1: School of Communication and Information Engineering
  • 2: Next Generation Networks
*Contact email: wangzq@cqupt.edu.cn

Abstract

This paper studies the price-based power control strategies for non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) based cognitive radio networks. The primary user (PU) profits from the secondary users (SUs) by pricing the interference power made by them. Then, SUs cooperate to maximize their total revenue at the base station (BS) with successive interference cancellation (SIC) while considering their payoff to the primary user. The pricing and power control strategies between the PU and SUs are modeled as a Stackelberg game. The closed-form expression of the optimal price for the non-uniform pricing scheme is given. The computational complexity of the proposed uniform-pricing algorithm is only linear with respect to the number of SNs. Simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness of our proposed pricing algorithm.

Keywords
Non-orthogonal multiple access Cognitive radio network Successive interference cancellation Stackelberg game
Published
2020-02-27
Appears in
SpringerLink
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41114-5_44
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