EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games 16(8): e5

Research Article

Tough Behavior in the Repeated Bargaining Game. A Computer Simulation Study.

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  • @ARTICLE{10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262403,
        author={Linh Chi Nguyen and Luciano Andreozzi},
        title={Tough Behavior in the Repeated Bargaining Game. A Computer Simulation Study.},
        journal={EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games},
        volume={16},
        number={8},
        publisher={ACM},
        journal_a={SG},
        year={2016},
        month={5},
        keywords={nash demand game, evolutionary game theory, simulation},
        doi={10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262403}
    }
    
  • Linh Chi Nguyen
    Luciano Andreozzi
    Year: 2016
    Tough Behavior in the Repeated Bargaining Game. A Computer Simulation Study.
    SG
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.3-12-2015.2262403
Linh Chi Nguyen1,*, Luciano Andreozzi2
  • 1: School of Social Sciences, University of Trento
  • 2: Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento
*Contact email: linhchi.nguyen@unitn.it

Abstract

Bargaining behavior occupies an important part in economics literature, or social sciences in general. Although there is an extensive simulation literature on social tradeoff in the Prisoner's Dilemma and the one-shot bargaining game, little has been done for the repeated bargaining game. Part of reason for this neglect is that, despite having a continuum of Nash equilibria, under homogeneous settings, the one shot bargaining game consistently gives a stable equilibrium of fairness (50-50 division), robust to many kind of tough perturbations. However, it's true that social interaction doesn't always yield unconditional egalitarianism. Hence we simulate a population of homogeneous agents playing the repeated bargaining game to test the stability of the 50-50 norm under evolutionary force. It turns out that when it comes to repeated interaction, the fair norm no longer stands strong.