1st International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks

Research Article

DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17,
        author={ I.  Khalil and  S.  Bagchi and C.  Nina-Rotaru},
        title={DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks},
        proceedings={1st International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={SECURECOMM},
        year={2006},
        month={3},
        keywords={},
        doi={10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17}
    }
    
  • I. Khalil
    S. Bagchi
    C. Nina-Rotaru
    Year: 2006
    DICAS: Detection, Diagnosis and Isolation of Control Attacks in Sensor Networks
    SECURECOMM
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17
I. Khalil1, S. Bagchi1, C. Nina-Rotaru1
  • 1: Purdue University

Abstract

Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes’ communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.