1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

Power control game in protected and shared bands: Manipulability of Nash equilibrium

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137429,
        author={Eduard   Jorswieck and Rami  Mochaourab},
        title={Power control game in protected and shared bands: Manipulability of Nash equilibrium},
        proceedings={1st International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
        publisher={IEEE},
        proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
        year={2009},
        month={6},
        keywords={},
        doi={10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137429}
    }
    
  • Eduard Jorswieck
    Rami Mochaourab
    Year: 2009
    Power control game in protected and shared bands: Manipulability of Nash equilibrium
    GAMENETS
    IEEE
    DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137429
Eduard Jorswieck1,2,*, Rami Mochaourab1,2,*
  • 1: Dresden University of Technology, Communications Laboratory,
  • 2: Communications Theory, D-01062 Dresden, Germany.
*Contact email: jorswieck@ifn.et.tu-dresden.de, mochaourab@ifn.et.tu-dresden.de

Abstract

We consider a downlink resource allocation problem for two systems or cells each consisting of a base station and multiple mobile stations. Each cell operates on a protected band for exclusive use and a band shared with the other cell. On simultaneous transmission in the shared band, the two systems disturb one another with interference. The strategies of the systems are their choices of power allocations in their two bands with regard to individual sum power constraints. Here, the conflict present between the systems is best analyzed using game theory. In the first part, we study the static non-cooperative power control game with complete information. Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are examined. Based on a suitable feedback model, we ask in the second part, whether the Nash equilibrium can be manipulated by reporting untruthful information within the system. The aim is to find suitable functions to suppress false feedback information from giving advantage to the dishonest system and degrading fairness between the systems. Here, we apply results from mechanism design to propose a modified expected payoff function at the mobile stations to force truthful feedback.