Research Article
Debt-based file exchange mechanism in peer-to-peer networks
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1109/CHINACOM.2007.4469376, author={Kun Yu and Yun-yang Yan and Hai-bin Mei and Sheng-hui Zhao}, title={Debt-based file exchange mechanism in peer-to-peer networks}, proceedings={2nd International ICST Conference on Communications and Networking in China}, publisher={IEEE}, proceedings_a={CHINACOM}, year={2008}, month={3}, keywords={Nash equilibrium P2P debt relationship files exchange incentive mechanism}, doi={10.1109/CHINACOM.2007.4469376} }- Kun Yu
Yun-yang Yan
Hai-bin Mei
Sheng-hui Zhao
Year: 2008
Debt-based file exchange mechanism in peer-to-peer networks
CHINACOM
IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/CHINACOM.2007.4469376
Abstract
The self-interest of peers degrades the system usability of P2P file sharing networks. Debt-based files exchange network constructs an incentive mechanism which induces cooperative and equivalent file exchange where creditor’s rights between neighbors play as light weight cash in file download. Creditor’s rights need only be maintained between neighbors, so maintenance cost is low and the mechanism is scalable for large networks. Number of files shared can be seen as a peer’s strategy selection. The game among rational peers exists a Nash equilibrium and the approximate algorithm of strategy selection gradually converges. Simulations indicate the effectiveness of incentive mechanism and steady performance in dynamic networks.