Research Article
Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7, author={Aron Laszka and D\^{a}vid Szeszl\^{e}r and Levente Butty\^{a}n}, title={Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Vancouver, BC, Canada, May 24-26, 2012, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={12}, keywords={game theory adversarial games network robustness directed graph strength graph persistence access networks sensor networks}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7} }- Aron Laszka
Dávid Szeszlér
Levente Buttyán
Year: 2012
Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7
Abstract
In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.