Research Article
A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17, author={Ralf Bornd\o{}rfer and Bertrand Omont and Guillaume Sagnol and Elmar Swarat}, title={A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. Third International ICST Conference, GameNets 2012, Vancouver, BC, Canada, May 24-26, 2012, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={12}, keywords={Stackelberg game Polymatrix game Controls in transportation networks}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17} }- Ralf Borndörfer
Bertrand Omont
Guillaume Sagnol
Elmar Swarat
Year: 2012
A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17
Abstract
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
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