Research Article
Anonymity for Key-Trees with Adaptive Adversaries
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23, author={Michael Beye and Thijs Veugen}, title={Anonymity for Key-Trees with Adaptive Adversaries}, proceedings={Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, UK, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={SECURECOMM}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={RFID Hash-lock protocol key-tree anonymity anonymity set adaptive adversaries}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23} }- Michael Beye
Thijs Veugen
Year: 2012
Anonymity for Key-Trees with Adaptive Adversaries
SECURECOMM
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23
Abstract
Hash-lock authentication protocols for Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Buttyán [4] and Beye and Veugen [3] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive attacks.