From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms

Yan Chen; Onur Kesten

Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms

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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17,
    author={Yan Chen and Onur Kesten},
    title={From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms},
    proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
    proceedings_a={AMMA},
    year={2012},
    month={10},
    keywords={},
    doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17}
}

Yan Chen
Onur Kesten
Year: 2012
From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms
AMMA
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17

Yan Chen¹^,*, Onur Kesten²^,*

1: University of Michigan
2: Carnegie Mellon University

*Contact email: yanchen@umich.edu, okesten@andrew.cmu.edu

Abstract

School choice has been one of the most important and widely-debated education policies in the past two decades, with game theory playing a major role in the adoption of school choice mechanisms. Similarly, college admissions in China have gone through many local experimentations, with a rich variety of mechanisms used in various provinces.

Published: 2012-10-08

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17