Research Article
Leasing and Pricing Strategies for Wireless Service Providers in Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_44, author={Peipei Chen and Qinyu Zhang and Yazhen Ren}, title={Leasing and Pricing Strategies for Wireless Service Providers in Dynamic Spectrum Sharing}, proceedings={Wireless Internet. 6th International ICST Conference, WICON 2011, Xi’an, China, October 19-21, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={WICON}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={Dynamic spectrum leasing Leasing and pricing Nash equilibrium Three-stage game}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_44} }- Peipei Chen
Qinyu Zhang
Yazhen Ren
Year: 2012
Leasing and Pricing Strategies for Wireless Service Providers in Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
WICON
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_44
Abstract
In dynamic spectrum sharing, Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) can dynamically acquire spectrum by leasing from spectrum broker and sell spectrum to users. In this paper, we model the interactions between secondary WSPs and users as a three-stage game with objective of maximizing WSPs’ profits. The competitive WSPs make leasing strategies in stage I and pricing strategies in stage II. Users follow Wardrop’s principle and choose WSP with respect to price and quality of service (QoS) in stage III. We analyze the static game by means of backward induction. Given the users’ equilibrium, the pricing sub-game and leasing full game for competitive WSPs both have a unique Nash equilibrium. The situation without complete information is also studied by dynamic game. The short term pricing dynamic game converges to the Nash equilibrium of the pricing sub-game, while the long term leasing dynamic game converges to the Nash equilibrium of the full game.
