Research Article
Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18, author={Yang Yan and Jianwei Huang and Ming Zhao and Jing Wang}, title={Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users}, proceedings={Wireless Internet. 6th International ICST Conference, WICON 2011, Xi’an, China, October 19-21, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={WICON}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={dynamic Bayesian spectrum bargaining cooperative spectrum sharing sequential equilibrium incomplete information game theory reputation effect}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18} }- Yang Yan
Jianwei Huang
Ming Zhao
Jing Wang
Year: 2012
Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users
WICON
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a cooperative spectrum sharing mechanism realized by a between a pair of primary user and secondary user. The primary user has only incomplete information of the secondary user’s energy cost. We model such a bargaining process as a dynamic Bayesian game, and discuss the equilibria under all possible system parameters. Furthermore, we discuss in details the where the plays an important role. Our analysis shows that the secondary user with a low energy cost can exploit the primary user’s lack of complete information for its own benefits.
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