Research Article
Dynamic Spectrum Negotiation with Asymmetric Information
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_36, author={Yang Yan and Jianwei Huang and Xiaofeng Zhong and Jing Wang}, title={Dynamic Spectrum Negotiation with Asymmetric Information}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={dynamic spectrum negotiation incomplete information game theory perfect bayesian equilibrium}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_36} }- Yang Yan
Jianwei Huang
Xiaofeng Zhong
Jing Wang
Year: 2012
Dynamic Spectrum Negotiation with Asymmetric Information
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_36
Abstract
Spectrum scarcity is becoming a serious issue due to the rapid development of wireless communication technology. Dynamic spectrum sharing can effectively improve the spectrum usage by allowing secondary unlicensed users (SUs) to dynamically and opportunistically share the spectrum with primary licensed users (PUs). In this paper, we investigate a spectrum negotiation mechanism under incomplete information in a dynamic environment, where both the PU and the SU can obtain rate increases through cooperative communications. Specifically, an SU relays traffics for a PU in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SU’s own communication needs. We model the bargaining process as dynamic Bayesian games and characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria under different system model parameters. Analysis and numerical results indicate that both PU and SU obtain performance improvements compared with no cooperation, and thus achieve a win-win situation via the spectrum negotiation.
