Research Article
Analyzing the Dynamics of Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on Structured Networks
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14, author={Ahmet Yazicioglu and Xiaoli Ma and Yucel Altunbasak}, title={Analyzing the Dynamics of Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on Structured Networks}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14} }- Ahmet Yazicioglu
Xiaoli Ma
Yucel Altunbasak
Year: 2012
Analyzing the Dynamics of Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on Structured Networks
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14
Abstract
The spread of cooperation in the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma can be facilitated by various means such as topological heterogeneities, a high benefit-to-cost ratio, or asymmetric interactions. In evolutionary dynamics, the agents adopt the strategies of neighbors with higher payoffs with a probability proportional to the payoff difference. In this study, we analyze evolutionary dynamics of mixed strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game through the expected value of the payoff difference for arbitrary neighbors and the evolutionary advantage/disadvantage of nodes due to the degree distributions within their neighborhoods. Simulation results for various networks and game parameters are also presented.