Research Article
Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12, author={Hazer Inaltekin and Mung Chiang and Harold Poor}, title={Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning}, proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={GAMENETS}, year={2012}, month={10}, keywords={Slotted ALOHA multipacket reception game theory contention control medium access control}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12} }
- Hazer Inaltekin
Mung Chiang
Harold Poor
Year: 2012
Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning
GAMENETS
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12
Abstract
This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.
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