Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

Research Article

Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12,
        author={Hazer Inaltekin and Mung Chiang and Harold Poor},
        title={Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning},
        proceedings={Game Theory for Networks. 2nd International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers},
        proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
        year={2012},
        month={10},
        keywords={Slotted ALOHA multipacket reception game theory contention control medium access control},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12}
    }
    
  • Hazer Inaltekin
    Mung Chiang
    Harold Poor
    Year: 2012
    Selfish Random Access: Equilibrium Conditions and Best-Response Learning
    GAMENETS
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_12
Hazer Inaltekin1,*, Mung Chiang2,*, Harold Poor2,*
  • 1: The University of Melbourne
  • 2: Princeton University
*Contact email: hazeri@unimelb.edu.au, chiangm@princeton.edu, poor@princeton.edu

Abstract

This paper studies a class of random access games for wireless channels with multipacket reception. First, necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions for a contention strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium for general wireless channels are established. Then, applications of these equilibrium conditions for well-known channel models are illustrated. Various engineering insights and design ideas are provided. Finally, the results are extended to an incomplete information game setting, and best-response learning dynamics leading to Nash equilibria are investigated.