Research Article
Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale
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@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15, author={Martin Bichler and Stefan Schneider and Kemal Guler and Mehmet Sayal}, title={Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale}, proceedings={Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers}, proceedings_a={AMMA}, year={2012}, month={5}, keywords={volume discount auctions procurement auctions economies of scale economies of scope}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15} }- Martin Bichler
Stefan Schneider
Kemal Guler
Mehmet Sayal
Year: 2012
Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale
AMMA
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15
Abstract
Economies of scale and scope describe key characteristics of production cost functions that influence allocations and prices on procurement markets. Auction designs for markets with economies of scale are much less well understood than combinatorial auctions, they require new bidding languages, and the supplier selection typically becomes a hard computational problem. We suggest a bidding language for respective markets, and conduct computational experiments to explore the incremental computational burden to determine optimal solutions brought about by the need to express economies of scope for problems of practical size.
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