Research Article
Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Flocks
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-642-02469-6_38, author={Zhuo Chen and Jianxi Gao and Yunze Cai and Xiaoming Xu}, title={Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Flocks}, proceedings={Complex Sciences. First International Conference, Complex 2009, Shanghai, China, February 23-25, 2009, Revised Papers, Part 2}, proceedings_a={COMPLEX PART 2}, year={2012}, month={5}, keywords={Cooperation Flocks Evolutionary games Prisoner’s Dilemma}, doi={10.1007/978-3-642-02469-6_38} }- Zhuo Chen
Jianxi Gao
Yunze Cai
Xiaoming Xu
Year: 2012
Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Flocks
COMPLEX PART 2
Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02469-6_38
Abstract
We investigate the effect of mobility on the evolution of cooperation in a flock model, where each player moves on the two-dimensional plane with the same absolute velocity. At each time step every player plays the prisoner’s dilemma game and aligns moving direction with its neighbors, who are chosen according to distances between them in the two-dimensional space. Experimental results have shown that with unconditional cooperation or defection, cooperation can be maintained in mobile players even for high velocities, as local interactions among players are enhanced by the expansion of neighborhood. However, the movement of players can only be offset within a certain range of temptation , while outside this range a rapid decrease of cooperators will appear in the population because too many neighbors are involved.
