A Machine Learning Based Approach for Mobile App Rating Manipulation Detection

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Abstract

In order to promote apps in mobile app stores, for malicious developers and users, manipulating average rating is a popular and feasible way. In this work, we propose a two-phase machine learning approach to detecting app rating manipulation attacks. In the first learning phase, we generate feature ranks for different app stores and find that top features match the characteristics of abused apps and malicious users. In the second learning phase, we choose top N features and train our models for each app store. With cross-validation, our training models achieve 85% f-score. We also use our training models to discover new suspicious apps from our data set and evaluate them with two criteria. Finally, we conduct some analysis based on the suspicious apps classified by our training models and some interesting results are discovered.

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1. Introduction

The current mobile application markets such as iTunes App Store, Google Play, Amazon App Store, Windows Phone App Store, etc. provide a very convenient and efficient way to distribute mobile apps. As of Feb. 2019, Google Play and iTunes host 2.45 millions and 1.3 millions of apps, respectively¹. A statistical study [1] showed that in 2017, consumers downloaded 178.1 billion mobile apps and in 2022, this figure was projected to grow to 258.2 billion app downloads. Meanwhile, the total app store revenue of Google Play and iTunes has exceeded 18.2 billions in the Q3 of 2018 alone [2]. All these numbers show that if developers release very popular apps, they could make a huge amount of profit from these apps. From computer security’s perspective, those app stores become the targets of attackers for the two following reasons: 1) Users prefer to download apps with higher rating scores when they have multiple choices, because they usually consider higher average rating stands for higher quality; 2) App store providers show various app ranking charts in their front pages and the higher ranking apps receive more attention and hence more downloads. App store providers’ ranking algorithms [3] take reviewers’ ratings as an important factor. Consequently, some companies started the business to provide app promotion services and some of them even claim that they could keep the ranks that developers want for some periods, according to news articles [4].

Purifying app stores becomes one of the app store providers’ primary interests. However, detecting app rating manipulation is difficult due to the following reasons: 1) massive number of accounts, reviews and apps makes it impossible to manually investigate the whole app store. Even it is possible to hire many people to manually investigate apps, discriminating malicious users from normal users is very difficult because rating reflects user’s opinion and opinion is often biased, and recent deep learning techniques [5] have enabled automatic generation of fake online user reviews that are similar to human-generated reviews. 2) many researchers have studied rating manipulation on online shopping websites. But compared with traditional products, mobile apps are either more accessible and their data are more noisy. Apps are more accessible because app stores are available in many countries and
developers may publish their apps world widely just by one click. For attackers, they can switch countries in app stores and attack apps across regions. Apps’ data are more noisy because apps have to be run on the top of hardware(smartphone) and OS. If hardware or OS gets upgraded, apps have to be optimized for the updates too. Failure to do so may result in lower average rating or app crash. More importantly, numbers of downloads and reviews are sensitive to app price. For traditional online shopping websites, 50% percentage discount is very rare, and even so, customers still have to pay. If a paid app drops its price to free, it’s very likely that many more users will download it. Besides, advertisements will introduce more noise to apps’ data.

Those difficulties and extremely noisy data lead us to seek machine learning for help. A big advantage of machine learning is that it provides an automatic way to figure out a model that human being is not able to conceive, and we can use this model to discover attacked (abused) apps. After analyzing the data we crawled from app stores and considering characteristics of malicious users and abused apps, we leveraged a supervised machine learning algorithm to design our classification model.

Our approach aims to detect abused apps directly instead of detecting attackers, which also can be used to discover abused apps indirectly. This is because: 1) detecting attackers is difficult due to the reasons we mentioned above; 2) apps that have been rated by attackers do not necessarily mean they have been abused. More information is needed to confirm this relation. To build a training set, we used an algorithm [6] to find an initial group of abused apps for us and, meanwhile, we select benign apps manually. We use a 2-step learning procedure to finalize our training model for each app store. Using cross-validation, our training models could reach 85% f-score given the fact that data are extremely noisy. We take a further step and use our training models to discover more apps from the data that are not included in the training set. About 5% suspicious apps are discovered from each app store and regions. This paper has the following contributions:

1. We characterized abused app, malicious user and collusion group they form.
2. We leveraged a machine learning based method to detect abused apps directly, bypassing the difficulties such discriminating attackers from normal users, data noise, etc..
3. We selected 55 features and gave feature rankings for each app store. We found that top features match our definitions and characteristics of abused apps, malicious users and collusion groups. These feature rankings can be used to further improve our training model performance, and other researchers who want to use different learning algorithms to detect abused apps could consider using these rankings directly.

4. We analyzed the abused apps discovered by our training models and some interesting results were found.

Section 2 provides formal definitions and characterizations of abused apps, malicious users and collusion groups. All 55 features are presented in Section 3. The machine learning approach and some detailed feature analyses are explained in Section 4. The testing is conducted in Section 5. We present some related work in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper and discusses some future work.

2. Preliminaries

To simplify our terms, in this paper, “user” only refers to a user who rates apps; “reviewer” only refers to a user who rates apps and leaves comments.

2.1. Definitions

For any app stores, the motivation of establishing an online rating system is to help users know the true quality of apps. Here we give our definition for true quality.

Definition 1. Let the total number of raters be $N$ and $r = (r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_N)$ is a vector that contains ratings of all raters. True quality $\tau$ is the expected value of $N$ users’ ratings, or

$$\tau = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} r_i$$

where $N \to \infty$.

Intuitively, abused app means an app’s average rating has been manipulated and its rating cannot correctly reflect its true quality. There is no direct way to know app’s true quality. Indirectly, as largely adopted today, app stores expect a large number of users will rate apps and leave comments, and hopefully, the average rating could be as close to the app’s true quality as possible. From an individual user’s perceptive, there are two problems:

1. Evaluating user’s experience with number is hard and inaccurate. No global standard defines the necessary conditions of a 5-star app, nor the necessary conditions of a 1-star app.
2. Individually, users are all biased. 1) Different users have different perspectives. User $A$ may focus on user interfaces, while user $B$ may focus on the stability and security. It’s very likely that
one app is perfect in terms of user interface, but poor in security; 2) Experience plays an important role. A user who has used more than 100 apps may not think Skype is the best app he has ever used. But for intro-level user, he might think Skype is the best app; 3) Apps usually support different versions of OS and hardware. An app could run perfectly on OS version 2.0 but crash on OS version 3.0.

Therefore, it is not safe to assume that average rating could accurately evaluate an app’s true quality. But to some extent, it can reflects the quality of an app. It is not likely that an app that is often crashed on any supported devices could gain 5-star average rating. Another way to look at this problem is that true quality of an app is the expected value of all its users’ ratings, including users that will rate this app in the future/theoretically, infinite number of users could rate this app) and each user in the data we have crawled is just one random variable that could reflect the expected value more or less. According to Hoeffding inequality[7], the larger the number of ratings, the closer this app’s average rating will be to its true quality.

For this problem, Hoeffding inequality states that for any sample size $N$ and vector of independent ratings $\Lambda = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \ldots, \lambda_N),$

$$P[|E(\Lambda) - \tau| > \delta] \leq 2e^{-2\delta^2N},$$

where $\delta$ is the difference between average rating $E(\Lambda)$ and app’s true quality $\tau$.

To confidently ensure that $\delta$ is very small, the number of ratings $N$ has to be relatively large. Therefore, we have the following theorem:

**Theorem 1.** For a relatively large number of ratings $N$ and each rating is independent from others, average rating $\sigma = \tau + \epsilon$, where $\tau$ is the true quality of an app, and $\epsilon$ is the deviation constant.

Rating is time sensitive. On the one hand, rating may change as an app’s true quality changes. Version changes, OS updates and device update usually lead to rating changes. On the other hand, in some cases, even an app’s true quality remains the same, its rating may change if similar apps come out later but provide more features and better user interface. Here, we give the definition of environment factor:

**Definition 2.** Environment factor is an factor that could affect users’ ratings for an app without any intention to manipulate that app’s average rating. Those factors include but are not restricted to version update, OS update, device update and release of similar apps.

According to the discussion above, we give our definition of abused app:

**Definition 3.** Let an app’s true quality be $\tau$ and its average rating $\sigma$. During a period of time $t$, when no environment factors are present, if $|\tau - \sigma| > \epsilon$, where $\epsilon$ is deviation constant, then we say this app is an abused app.

### 2.2. Characteristics of Abused App and Malicious User

While users might be biased, when a large amount of benign users rate an app, the average rating will be close to its true quality. The definitions of benign user and malicious user are:

**Definition 4.** A user who rates apps only based on his/her own experience is a benign user.

**Definition 5.** A user is a malicious user if he/she rates apps not based on his/her own experience and his/her rating deviates from the true quality of app by $\eta$, where $|\eta| > 0$.

To effectively manipulate the ratings, it has to involve many malicious users who appear in a relatively short period of time. If only a small number of malicious users rate an app, its average rating may not change abruptly. Theoretically, presence of extremely biased ratings in a very short period time is not a necessary condition for rating manipulation. However, by observation, we find that it is a normal case for rating manipulation. Figure 1 plots the number of raters for each star of the app with app ID 445798230 and version 2.1. What makes this app suspicious (we will later confirm that this app is abused) are: 1) there is a huge spike of number of 5-star ratings in week 2; 2) The spike only occurred on 5-star rating.

![Figure 1. Number of Each Star (App ID: 399363156, Version: 2.1)](image-url)
Mohammad, et al.[8] proposes the idea of collusion group in rating manipulation. For app’s rating manipulation, [6] modifies the definition of collusion group and gives the following definition:

**Definition 6. Collusion group** is an attacking group where all the members are malicious users and there exist a set of apps whose ratings have been manipulated by some of them. To be more generic, collusion group is a set of adjacent subgroups where each subgroup works as an unit to attack an app each time. To be considered as adjacent, two subgroups must share some raters.

Essentially, one collusion group is formed by several bi-clique communities[6, 9]. It’s shown that the existence of collusion group is a necessary condition for rating manipulation. Another feature of collusion group is that the rating histories of group members are similar, which means group members usually rate apps on the same day or in the same week. This feature conceptually matches the conditions of app rating manipulation — large number of malicious users and in a short period of time.

According to Definition 3, 6 and Theorem 1, we have the following theorem:

**Theorem 2.** In a period of time t, an app is an **abused app** if it satisfies all the following conditions:

1. No environment factors are present.
2. There exists at least one collusion group.
3. Number of ratings N is relatively large.
4. Let the current average rating be \( \hat{\lambda} \), and average rating without the effect of collusion group be \( \lambda \). |\( \hat{\lambda} - \lambda \)| > \( \epsilon \).

In fact, we are capable of estimating N by using Hoeffding inequality. Assume that we want to be sure that \( \hat{\lambda} = 0.1 \), then we can have the following calculation:

\[
P[|E(\Lambda) - \tau| > 0.1] \leq 2e^{-2(0.1)^2N}\]  

(3)

When \( N = 100 \), \( P[|E(\Lambda) - \tau| \leq 0.1] \geq 0.7293 \). When \( N = 200 \), \( P[|E(\Lambda) - \tau| \leq 0.1] \geq 0.9634 \). It means, for an app, if the number of total raters is larger than 100, we have more than 72.93% confidence to claim that its current average rating is close to its true quality; if the number of total raters is larger than 200, we have more than 96.34% confidence to claim that its current average rating is close to its true quality.

Note that one of Hoeffding inequality’s assumptions is that ratings are independent from each other. If there exist multiple collusion groups, theorem 1 will not hold. But consider these three situations:

1. If no collusion group exists, we are safe to assume that all the ratings are independent (it’s possible that only few ratings are not). In this case, given a large number of ratings, we could precisely estimate \( \tau \);
2. If collusion groups exist and the number of ratings is small, we cannot even confidently estimate \( \tau \). Therefore, we should not label this app as an abused one;
3. If collusion groups exist and the number of ratings is large, practically, compared with number of ratings, the size of collusion groups only takes a very small fraction. In this case, if we remove collusion groups from ratings, we will still be able to estimate \( \tau \).

Assume no environment factors are present. In order to archive the manipulated average rating \( \delta = \tau + \epsilon_0(\epsilon_0 > \epsilon) \), the size of collusion group has to be:

\[
S = \frac{\epsilon_0N}{\eta - \epsilon_0}\]  

(4)

where \( \eta = \lambda - \tau \) and \( \lambda \) is the rating that each malicious user gives.

To significantly manipulate app average rating with a small collusion group, \( \eta \) should be as large as possible, which means collusion group members usually always give 5-star ratings. For app A with rating user population \( N = 10000 \) and average rating \( \tau = 3.5 \), in order to reach \( \delta = 3.8 \), the size of collusion group \( S \approx 834 \), assuming that every collusion group member gives 5-star ratings (\( \lambda = 5 \)). If every collusion group member gives 4-star rating (\( \lambda = 4 \)), the collusion group size will be \( S = 5000 \). This also explains the reason that collusion group usually rates an app at a relatively short time window: if \( N \) increases by time, \( S \) has to increase as well.

Therefore, we have the following theorem for malicious users:

**Theorem 3.** A user is a **malicious user** if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. He is a member of at least one collusion group.
2. In all malicious events he participates, most of ratings are he gives are either 4-stars or 5-stars.

### 2.3. Threat Models

We have known that to manipulate an app’s average rating, collusion groups have to exist. But how are collusion groups formed? We found two possible ways for malicious users to form a collusion group.

1. **Direct Formation** means someone directly hires a group of malicious users or fakes a large number of IDs to launch attacks. For iTunes app store, this kind of collusion groups sometimes have
2. **Indirect Formation** means someone *indirectly* hires a group of malicious users. For example, we found that some websites welcome volunteers to purchase apps and leave comments. Volunteers will get total refund and bonus after that. No fake IDs are needed in this attack, so consecutive IDs usually will not be found.

3. A Machine Learning Approach

3.1. Why Use Machine Learning?

Even we know the characteristics of abused apps, it’s still very difficult to find out them due to the following reasons:

1. Defining a threshold number of ratings $N$ is hard.
2. Finding the exact value of $\epsilon$ is difficult.
3. Detecting a collusion group in a malicious app is unreachable by human. To verify a group is a collusion group, we have to make sure it has attacked at least two apps. This process is time-consuming. It is possible that a collusion group only attack one app, but we will lose it since we could not verify its existence. Therefore, we need to find other features that could reflect the existence of collusion group.
4. It’s nearly impossible to rule out all environment factors.

The above reasons motivate us to use machine learning to overcome the difficulties we face. The goal of machine learning is to find a hypothesis $h$ from hypothesis set $\mathcal{H}$ that is closest to the function $f$, which is a function mapping a vector $x$ to $y$[10]. For this problem, vector $x$ denotes the values of features for each app and $y$ is a binary value indicates if this app is abused or not.

With the help of machine learning, we do not have to worry about finding exact values of $N$, $\epsilon$ and exact values of features describing the existence of collusion group, because we can leverage machine learning algorithms to find the best $h$ from a training dataset.

The way we decide the best training model $h$ is to minimize both $E_{\text{train}}$ and $E_{\text{test}}$ given a dataset, where $E_{\text{train}}$ is the error rate that $h$ has in training set and $E_{\text{test}}$ is the error rate that $h$ has in the complete data set, no matter what evaluation method we use to calculate error rates. However, measuring $E_{\text{test}}$ is tricky since there is no way to know $E_{\text{test}}$. That is why cross-validation[11] is important — only use a part of original training data as new training data and use the rest to measure $E_{\text{test}}$. While we may not be able to find a training model $h$ that minimizes both $E_{\text{train}}$ and $E_{\text{test}}$, it is feasible to find a training model $h$ that minimize $E_{\text{test}}$ and has relative small $E_{\text{train}}$ using cross-validation method. In this way, we can avoid both overfitting and under-fitting problem.

In machine learning, factors that we cannot control or expect are noises. In this problem, environment factors can be treated as noises. However, not all environment factors are uncontrollable. iTunes App Store provides version information for each comment, therefore, we may generate some features based on version. By avoiding fitting training data perfectly (overfitting), the effects of noise to training data will be minimized[12]. This is another advantage we want to take from machine learning.

3.2. Features

Feature is a numeric value describing data from one or more aspects. We transform the data we crawled from app stores into different features so that learning algorithms are able to learn from the data. In this section, we will discuss all the features we select.

**Primary Features.** We define primary features as the features that can be collected from the raw data itself without further processing and transformation. For better understanding, we will use some space to elaborate them in the pattern $\text{feature}_\text{name}(\text{feature}_\text{ID})$.

- **average_rating(1)** : average of all ratings.
- **total_rater(2)** : number of all ratings.
- **1star_num(3)** : number of all 1 star ratings.
- **2star_num(4)** : number of all 2 star ratings.
- **3star_num(5)** : number of all 3 star ratings.
- **4star_num(6)** : number of all 4 star ratings.
- **5star_num(7)** : number of all 5 star ratings.
- **price(8)** : 1 if this is a paid app; otherwise 0.

Readers may be curious about the motivation of including feature 3–8 because it does not seem to make much sense to put them into feature set. In section 4.4, we will see that the learning algorithm we use is able to rank these features based on their importance. Therefore, we are safe to put all the features that could describe the app data into our feature set.
**Advanced Features.** Besides the primary features that are ready to be used without any pre-processing, we want to transform the comment and reviewer data into more advanced features.

\[\text{num\_dev}(9)\]: a developer may develop more than one apps. This feature describes how many apps a developer has developed.

To describe the reviewers' behavior, we define the following terms:

**Definition 7.** If a reviewer gives 4 or 5 stars for all the apps that he/she has rated, he/she is a **positive reviewer**; if a reviewer gives 1 or 2 stars for all the apps that he/she has rated, he/she is a **negative reviewer**.

Many reviewers only rate app once, so it might be risky to label those reviewers as positive reviewers or negative reviewers. To avoid this potential pitfalls, we define the following terms:

**Definition 8.** If a **positive reviewer** rates 3 or more apps, he/she is **extremely positive reviewer**; if a negative reviewer rates 3 or more apps, he/she is **extremely negative reviewer**.

\[\text{num\_pos\_reviewer}(10)\]: number of positive reviewers of this app.

\[\text{perc\_pos\_reviewer}(11)\]: percentage of positive reviewers, or \(\frac{\text{num\_pos\_reviewer}}{\text{total\_number\_of\_reviewer}}\). Note that total number of reviewer is not total rater, because reviewers leaves comments in addition but raters do not.

\[\text{num\_neg\_reviewer}(12)\]: number of negative reviewers of this app.

\[\text{perc\_neg\_reviewer}(13)\]: percentage of negative reviewers, or \(\frac{\text{num\_neg\_reviewer}}{\text{total\_number\_of\_reviewer}}\).

\[\text{num\_extr\_pos\_reviewer}(14)\]: number of extremely positive reviewers of this app.

\[\text{perc\_extr\_pos\_reviewer}(15)\]: percentage of extremely positive reviewers of this app, or \(\frac{\text{num\_extr\_pos\_reviewer}}{\text{total\_number\_of\_reviewer}}\).

\[\text{num\_extr\_neg\_reviewer}(16)\]: number of extremely negative reviewers of this app.

\[\text{perc\_extr\_neg\_reviewer}(17)\]: percentage of extremely positive reviewers of this app, or \(\frac{\text{num\_extr\_neg\_reviewer}}{\text{total\_number\_of\_reviewer}}\).

Helpfulness might be useful as well.

\[\text{helpfulness\_ratio\_avg}(18)\]: helpfulness ratio is \(\frac{\text{number\_of\_people\_agree}}{\text{number\_of\_people\_agree} + \text{number\_of\_people\_disagree}}\). This is the average of helpfulness ratio, or \(\frac{\sum \text{helpfulness\_ratio}}{\text{number\_of\_comment}}\).

\[\text{num\_helpfulness}(19)\]: number of comments whose helpfulness ratios are greater than 0.

\[\text{perc\_helpfulness}(20)\]: percentage of comments whose helpfulness ratios are greater than 0, or \(\frac{\text{num\_helpfulness}}{\text{number\_of\_comment}}\).

Variance is able to describe how much fluctuation a feature has. We aggregate comment data by week. We think it is an appropriate granularity since we only have data divided in days and usually rating manipulation spans weeks. The term “rating” in the following paragraphs is only the rating with comments, since only comments have date information.

\[\text{var\_num\_comment\_by\_week}(21)\]: variance of number of comments by week.

\[\text{var\_avg\_rating\_by\_week}(22)\]: variance of average ratings by week.

\[\text{var\_perc\_rating\_by\_week}(23, 24, 25, 26, 27)\]: variance of percentage of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 star ratings by week.

\[\text{var\_perc\_pos\_reviewer\_by\_week}(28)\]: variance of percentage of positive reviewers by week.

\[\text{var\_perc\_neg\_reviewer\_by\_week}(29)\]: variance of percentage of negative reviewers by week.

We notice that when an app is just released, or there is a version update, there will be some spike in terms of number of ratings. Poisson distribution is often used to describe those spikes. To let user know about new apps, app stores usually put them into a new category, which is located in an obvious place on the front page. A few days or weeks later, other new apps come and replace those old ones. Another case is, when an app is updated, people who have used it tend to download and rate it or leave comment on it again. Commercials and ads may attract users’ attention too. All these factors could lead to spikes of reviews, and number of reviewers usually follow the Poisson distribution.

Figures 2 and 3 depict the Poisson distributions that we use to fit the data. Readers may see that Poisson distributions we found out does not fit the data perfectly. Since we want to use Poisson distribution to find the locations of spikes, so it does not matter. However, the tricky part of the fitting is on the granularity we choose. If we choose a very fine granularity, then it may end up with plentiful spikes. If we choose a coarse granularity, we may miss some spikes. To mitigate this problem, we choose 20% largest values from the dataset and use them as initial values to find Poisson distributions that fit the data with least square error measurement. That is the reason that there are only two Poisson distributions in Figure 2. After
locating all the Poisson distributions, we are able to use those data as features.

**poisson_num_peaks** (30): number of Poisson distributions we find.

**poisson_first_peaks** (31): relative position of first Poisson distribution (the one with smallest $\lambda$), or $\frac{\min(\lambda)}{\text{number of weeks}}$.

**poisson_last_peaks** (32): relative position of last Poisson distribution (the one with largest $\lambda$) or $\frac{\max(\lambda)}{\text{number of weeks}}$.

We define the following terms to capture special weeks:

**Definition 9.** If during one week, all the ratings are 4 or 5 stars, this week is a **positive week**; if all the ratings are 1 or 2 stars, this week is a **negative week**.

Then we select the following features:

**num_week** (33): number of weeks of this app’s lifespan (or till now).

**num_pos_week** (34): number of positive weeks.

**num_neg_week** (35): number of negative weeks.

**perc_pos_week** (36): percentage of positive weeks, or $\frac{\text{num_pos_week}}{\text{num_week}}$.

**perc_neg_week** (36): percentage of negative weeks, or $\frac{\text{num_neg_week}}{\text{num_week}}$.

**max_pos_week** (38): largest number of continuous weeks that all of them are positive weeks.

**perc_max_pos_week** (39): percentage of largest number of continuous weeks that all of them are positive weeks, or $\frac{\text{max_pos_week}}{\text{num_week}}$.

**max_neg_week** (40): largest number of continuous weeks that all of them are negative weeks.

**perc_max_neg_week** (41): percentage of largest number of continuous weeks that all of them are negative weeks, or $\frac{\text{max_neg_week}}{\text{num_week}}$.

Even though app version is an environment factor, we want to capture its effect. We firstly treat each version of app as an individual app, then normalize it.

**var_perc_pos_reviewer_by_week_by_version** (42): summation of variances of percentage of positive reviewers by week, then normalized by number of versions, or $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{var}_{\text{perc_pos_reviewer}}_{i}}{n}$, where $n$ is number of versions.

**var_perc_neg_reviewer_by_week_by_version** (43): summation of variances of percentage of negative reviewers by week, then normalized by number of versions, or $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{var}_{\text{perc_neg_reviewer}}_{i}}{n}$, where $n$ is number of versions.

**var_avg_rating_by_week_by_version** (44): summation of variance of average ratings by week, then normalized by number of versions, or $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{var}_{\text{avg_rating}}_{i}}{n}$.
We found that in normal apps, the increment of number of reviewers will lead to increment of number of each star. Xie and Zhu [13] point out that, in normal apps, correlation coefficient between number of reviewers and average rating in each week should be close to 0, which means these two factors should have no apparent relation and should have no effect to each other. Therefore, we could have the following features:

\[ \text{coef}_{\text{avg num rating by week}}(55) : \text{correlation coefficient between average rating and number of raters by week.} \]

**Summary** In this section, we basically elaborate all the features that we collect and build from our data. Two kinds of features are included: 1) app’s primary features and 2) app’s advanced features describing its ratings, comments and reviewers information. In Section 4.5, we will discuss features’ rankings by importance and how we use machine learning algorithms to generate training model from training data and those features.

4. Training

4.1. Dataset Collection

We built a multi-threaded crawler to collect app information from three iTunes App Stores located in US, China and UK, respectively. We crawl three kinds of webpages in app stores: app overview pages, comment pages and user profile pages. App overview page usually contains number of ratings, average ratings, general description, app permissions, etc. Comment page contains the names and IDs of reviewers and comments’ dates and contents. iTunes(Apple App Store) also provides the corresponding app version for each comment. User profile page contains all comments that each user leaves.

Our data crawling was performed in 2013. Table 1 lists the data size we have for these three app stores.

4.2. App Discrimination For Training Set

Training set is required for any machine learning problems, because our final hypothesis function \( f \) has to learn from it. To guarantee the performance of our training model, our training set has two following requirements:

1. The size of our training set should be large enough.
2. Training set should be not be biased.

4.3. Abused App Detection For Training Set With Confirmation Of Existence Of Collusion Groups

We use an algorithm proposed by Xie and Zhu [6] to detect abused apps for our training set. This algorithm has the following features:

1. Threshold constants such as number of ratings \( N \), correlation coefficients between different attributes, threshold of collusion group size, etc. are pre-defined.
2. Collusion groups are discovered and confirmed in order to label abused apps correctly.
Table 1. Data Size Table. Here Completeness is approximated percentage of apps we have crawled in an app store. Since no data could be found to show the actual sizes of iTunes App Stores in China and UK, we assume 1 million (the same as the U.S market, as of 2013) in calculating completeness.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>App store</th>
<th>Apps</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Reviewers</th>
<th>Total Apps</th>
<th>Completeness</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iTunes(U.S)</td>
<td>23,616</td>
<td>18,925,438</td>
<td>10,328,118</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
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<tr>
<td>iTunes(China)</td>
<td>21,831</td>
<td>9,320,807</td>
<td>5,568,424</td>
<td>1 million</td>
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<td>11,761,493</td>
<td>6,413,303</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. Other constraints that could indicate rating manipulation are considered.

The most important advantage of this algorithm is that it will confirm the existence of collusion groups. Therefore the true positive rate of this algorithm is very high. However, confirmation can be made only if the collusion group has attacked at least two apps, presuming that those apps have been crawled by us. Therefore, if collusion groups that have only attacked one app, or only one of apps that has been attacked by collusion groups in our dataset, we will not be able to detect neither collusion groups and abused apps. Even this is a problem, with the help of this algorithm, our training model is still able to know what abused apps look like and figure out the distinctions between abused apps and benign(normal) apps.

Picking Apps For Training Set Manually. Section 4.3 only detects abused apps for training set. In order to both increase the size of training set and keep training set as unbiased as possible, we also manually detect abused apps and pick normal apps from our data set.

The method of manually detecting abused apps is: 1) looking for rating spikes that are similar to one shown figure 1 in one version of app; 2) confirming that there is at least one collusion group that has attacked at least two apps; 3) taking a look at the content of reviews left by the members of collusion groups. The usual case is that malicious users tend to leave short comments containing less valuable information.

This method has both pros and cons:

Pros the algorithm we use to automatically find abused apps uses very strong constraints. Our method could find some abused apps that this algorithm missed.

Cons we could possibly missed some abused apps since the review data is too large for human being to process.

We only label abused apps and put them into training set and ignore the rests. Therefore, training set only contains abused apps that can be theoretically confirmed.

To pick benign apps for training set, we use the following four methods:

1. Almost all ratings are 4 stars or 5 stars. Figure 4 falls into this case. This app turns out to be Google Map. Although there is a huge spike in this graph, it is normal as this app’s numbers of total ratings by week could be fitted to Poisson distribution nicely, which indicates that this spike is created by a normal user behavior. Moreover, the numbers of 1 stars and 2 stars increase or decrease as the numbers of 4 and 5 stars go up or down.

2. Apps that are publicly known due to their good qualities and their high average ratings (between 4-star and 5-star). It seems very risky to label those apps as benign ones, but is actually understandable. If an app's rating is very high, such as 4.5 and is always that high, even if collusion groups exist, it’s unlikely that $\epsilon$ could be larger than deviation threshold. If the deviation threshold is $\epsilon = 0.5$, then it’s impossible for this app to reach this threshold. “Publicly known” means the number of ratings N is relatively large, so it’s extremely difficult to manipulate the average rating, as shown in equation 4.

3. Apps that are developed by some companies that have gained public trust. We select the apps developed by Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook,
Y. Song, C. Wu, S. Zhu, H. Wang

Amazon, etc. Those companies have been playing with software and its market for a long time and users usually will download their apps just because they rely on the services these companies provide, such as Google Map, Facebook, Pages and so forth.

4. Apps whose numbers of reviews are less than 100. As we shown in Section 2.2, we only have 72.93% confidence to claim that app's current average rating is close to its true quality within 0.1. We select some of those apps and put them into our training set.

These four methods basically cover popular apps, unpopular apps, high average rating and low average rating apps, aiming to reduce the bias of training set. Readers may question us about the correctness of our methods, especially method 3. In Section 4.3, we will justify them.

Training Set Overview. By applying the methods we proposed above to pick our training set, we have the following data as our training sets.

We would like to mention that in machine learning theory, picking training data is very tricky, specially when we are able to pick data by ourselves. If the training data are biased, our training model will be biased as well. To mitigate these potential issues, when we are picking benign apps, not only did we try to make sure the apps are benign, but also, from the whole training set's perspective, make sure that we are building a mini version of iTunes app store. That’s why we put popular apps, unpopular apps, high average rating apps and low average rating apps, high ranking apps, low ranking apps, apps that have been published for a very long time and newly released apps into our training set.

Ground Truth. Readers may question us about the absence of ground truth for training set and we do have the following explanations:

1. Ground truth is not a necessary condition for machine learning problems. Ground truth refers to the correctness (accuracy) of a test set's classification for supervised learning. However, many supervised learning do not have ground truth in the first place. Some banks use machine learning to decide whether their applicants are qualified for credit cards or not. The training set they use is gathered from historical decisions made by credit officers. However, whether an applicant is truly qualified for credit cards are unknown since banks could not have the complete information about applicants and applicants could lie about their annual income and other financial information. In this case, the decision sometimes is based on how much trust credit officers have for applicants.

2. Asking ground truth for an opinion based behavior is difficult. Rating manipulation is similar to credit card application, whether an app is abused or not is basically based on how much trust we have for ratings (or users themselves). From app market providers’ perspective, if they trust all the ratings, no app is abused; if they don't trust any ratings, all apps are abused. If some organizations or authorities could possibly give us the ground truth, it is still based on their opinions. For any online rating system research, no researchers have claimed that they have ground truth[14][15]. Theorem 2 and lemma 1 are our baselines for discriminating abused apps from benign ones.

3. The goal of using machine learning in this problem is not ruling out human’s intervention. Since whether an app is abused or not is subjective, using machine learning aims to narrow down the scope of the highly suspicious apps instead of replacing human's work, especially when highly sensitive decisions have to be made.

4. To avoid the arguable discrimination, we only label abused apps that we are confident with. High accuracy is good for any machine learning problems. But for abused app detection, it is more safe to assume a suspicious app as benign one than an abused one. Therefore, we also expect a higher precision (the percentage of labeling an app as an abused one correctly) in cross-validation. Readers may question us about method 2 and 3 we use to pick benign apps in Section 4.3. But both methods show that we tend to draw a line between companies that the public trust and companies who need rating manipulation to promote their apps. Including trustworthy companies’ apps into training data has another advantage: both abused apps and benign apps’ rating can be affected by environment factors (defined in definition 2). By doing so, we could indirectly tell the learning algorithm that some data influenced by environment factors are noise and should not be taken into consideration while it is learning the training data and making classification.

4.4. Training With Random Forest

Random Forest [16] is an ensemble[17] machine learning algorithm proposed by Leo Breiman. Generally speaking, random forest is a meta estimator that fits a number of decision tree classifiers on various
Table 2. Training Set Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>App store</th>
<th>Abused Apps</th>
<th>Normal(benign) Apps</th>
<th>Total Apps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iTunes US</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTunes China</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTunes UK</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm 1: Feature Filter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ( f_score \leftarrow \text{list}() )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ( \text{for } n \leftarrow (\text{len(feature_ranking)}, 10, -1) \text{ do} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ( \text{feature_list} \leftarrow \text{top_n(feature_ranking)} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ( \text{f_score_local} \leftarrow \text{list}() )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ( \text{for } n_\text{estimator} \leftarrow (61, 101, 2) \text{ do} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ( \text{rfc} \leftarrow \text{RandomForest}(n_\text{estimator}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ( \text{avg_f_score} \leftarrow 5_\text{fold_CV}(\text{rfc}, \text{feature_list}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ( \text{Insert} \text{avg_f_score} \text{into f_score_local} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ( \text{end} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ( \text{max_f_score} \leftarrow \text{max}(\text{f_score_local}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. ( \text{Inserts} (\text{max_f_score}, n) \text{into f_score} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ( \text{end} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. ( \text{Returns} f_score \text{and its} n )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-samples of the dataset and uses averaging to improve the predictive accuracy and control over-fitting. “Forest” refers to decision tree\cite{18}, where each node corresponds to one of the input variables; each leaf represents the target variable’s value. “Random” refers to the method of choosing \( m \) variables from total \( M \) variables randomly for each node of the tree and sample training set for each tree randomly \cite{19}. The algorithm of how each tree is grown as follows:

1. Sample \( N \) training cases randomly from original training set as new localized training set for growing the tree, where \( N \) is the size of original training set.

2. For each node in the tree, \( m \) input variables are selected from total \( M \) variables and \( m \ll M \).

3. Each tree is grown to the largest extent possible.

The number of estimators(trees) is not specified. Increasing number of estimators does not always guarantee better accuracy \cite{20}, so we will try different numbers of trees when we are training our models.

Among many popular machine learning algorithms such as SVM \cite{21}, neural network \cite{22}, deep learning \cite{23}, etc., we choose random forest as our learning algorithm due to the following several reasons:

1. It runs efficiently on large data set.

2. It gives estimates of what variables are important in the classification. We will use this advantage to analyze our features in Section 4.5.

3. The algorithm itself does not overfit when increasing the number of trees in the forest. Random forest use “bagging”\cite{24} to select a subset of training data to grow a tree and use the rest of them to do internal validation.

To improve our training model \cite{25}, we do not use the training model generated by random forest(a). Instead, we use feature filter to work with random forest(b) to select top \( n \) features – \( n \) is chosen by comparing the evaluations performed with 5-fold cross-validation. We use algorithm 1 to select the best top \( n \) features.

The inner loop will iterate over different number of trees(n_estimator) in random forest algorithm to find the best number of trees for it, as we mentioned in the beginning of Section 4. n_estimator is always an odd number in order to make sure classification results are deterministic since each tree takes a vote for the target value. The outer loop will select top \( n \) (from 10 to 55 in this case) and pick the best f-score from the inner loop.

There is a theory behind the feature filtering step. VC-dimension\cite{26} is introduced to measure the complexity of the size of hypothesis set \( \mathcal{H} \), denoted by \( |\mathcal{H}| \). The more features that we use to training our model, the larger \( |\mathcal{H}| \) is, so is the VC-dimension. However, practically speaking, the smaller VC-dimension will result in under-fitting and the larger VC-dimension will result in over-fitting. From random forest’s perspective, the more features we introduce, the more complicated each decision tree is. In this case, we might end up with using too many features to learn training set and these features will form a very specific concept, which has poor generalization. If we do not include enough number of features, the decision tree is very simple. In this case, those features will form a very board concept that will cover many negative instances. Feature filter can solve this problem by iterating all the top \( n \) features and find a training model that is neither under-fitting nor over-fitting.

When we get the best testing results (highest f-score in this case), we select this training model as our final hypothesis \( h \), as we discussed in Section 3.1, and we use \( h \) to classify new abused apps from residual data. The whole training is done with scikit-learn\cite{27}. 
4.5. Feature Importance

As we mentioned in Section 4.4, random forest could estimates the importance of each feature. Feature importances are generated during the training process. Therefore, it is not a separated procedure from training. But analyzing features can be very helpful when we want to know more about the data and figure out which features contribute more in the training model.

A popular feature importance measuring method was proposed by Leo Breiman[16]. The essence of this method is to rank the error rate of each forest grown with different composition of features by calculating gini index [28].

![Feature Ranking By Importance](image)

**Figure 5. US iTunes app store feature ranking by importance**

**US iTunes App Store Feature Ranking.** Figure 5 shows the feature ranking by importance in US iTunes app store. All the importance values of features are normalized. The higher ranking the feature has, the more error the training model will generate without this feature. By depicting the feature ranking, we are able to see which features play important role during abused app detection and we can also give some reasonable explanations over the ranks of first 10 features.

1. **num_dev**: in US iTunes app store, abused apps are usually developed by small companies who developed a few apps. We manually inspect the developer websites of some abused apps in the training set and find that usually those websites are ill-designed and have poor user interface. Those companies are not well-known and are recognized as small companies.

2. **perc_helpfulness**: users in US app store usually like to give feedback on other users’ comments. Helpfulness is a very effective way to reflect the usefulness of comments. To speed up their attacking process, attackers usually leave some simple and uninformative comments, which draw little attention of normal users. Moreover, iTunes ranks the comments not only by comment dates, but also by helpfulness ratio. Therefore, the more informative comments will gain more feedbacks.

3. **perc_pos_reviewer**: as we suggested in Section 2.2, to manipulate the average rating as effective as possible, malicious users tend to give high ratings(4 or 5) each time. This feature is a strong indication of existence of malicious users and collusion groups.

4. **helpfulness_ratio_avg**: besides perc_helpfulness, this feature describes the percentage of agrees. An uninformative comments even though gain some feedback, but they are usually negative feedback. In other words, informative and genuine comments will have higher average helpfulness ratio but fake comments left by attackers will have lower value.

5. **var_num_rating_by_week_by_version**: apps with low value of this feature will be in safe area. High value of this feature could be suspicious as the existence of collusion groups could result in this, even we still need other features to confirm our suspicion because environment factors are strong noises. Advertising or dropping price could also lead to this high variance.

6. **var_num_rating_by_week_by_version**: similar to var_num_rating_by_week_by_version but ignore the app version factor.

7. **num_extr_pos_reviewer**: similar to perc_pos_reviewer. These two features together indicate the high number of reviewers, which is a necessary condition of abused app.
8. **perc_to_pos reviewer**: similar to **perc_pos reviewer**, but this feature is a stronger indication of existence of malicious users and collusion groups since extreme positive reviewer is a reviewer who has given 4 or 5 stars at least 3 times.

9. **total_rater**: usually large number of total raters leads to large number of reviewers, which is a necessary condition of abused app.

10. **perc_neg reviewer**: lower value of this feature makes apps more suspicious. We found that, in most cases, malicious users and collusion groups promote apps instead of demoting other developers’ apps. Lower value of this feature suggests the larger number of normal users (neither negative users nor positive users) and positive users.

---

**Feature Ranking By Importance**

![Feature Ranking By Importance](image)

**Figure 6.** China iTunes app store feature ranking by importance.

**China iTunes App Store Feature Ranking.** Figure 6 shows normalized feature ranking by importance in China iTunes app store. We next give explanations for top 10 features.

1. **perc_pos reviewer**: as discussed in Section 4.5, high value of this feature strongly indicates the existence of malicious users and collusion groups.

2. **var_num_rating_by_week_by_version**: apps whose numbers of ratings by week are stable are usually benign ones.

3. **perc_to_pos reviewer**: similar to **perc_pos reviewer**.

4. **var_num_rating_by_week**: Usually both popular apps and abused apps share this feature if this value is relatively large. But apps with low value of this feature are normal ones.

5. **total_rater**: identical to that in Section 4.5.

6. **num_pos reviewer**: similar to **perc_pos reviewer**.

7. **num_pos reviewer**: similar to **num_pos reviewer**.

8. **coef_avg_rating_num_by_week**: as suggested in [13], the value of this feature should be close to 0. High correlation between average rating and number of reviewers indicates that there are malicious users and collusion groups manipulating average rating.

9. **coef_pos_neg_rating_by_week**: similar to **coef_1.5_rating_by_week**.

10. **perc_helpfulness**: identical to this feature in Section 4.5.

**UK iTunes App Store Feature Ranking.** Figure 7 shows normalized feature ranking by importance in UK iTunes app store. We will give explanations for top 10 features.

1. **perc_helpfulness**: same as this feature in Section 4.5.

2. **num_dev**: same as this feature in Section 4.5.

3. **helpfulness_ratio_avg**: similar to **perc_helpfulness**.

4. **perc_pos reviewer**: same as this feature in Section 4.5 and Section 4.5.

5. **num_pos reviewer**: identical to this feature in Section 4.5.

6. **var_num_rating_by_week**: even high value of this feature cannot increase the possibility of labeling an app as abused app, low value of this feature could rule out some benign apps and narrow down our scope.

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Figure 7. UK iTunes app store feature ranking by importance

7. var_num_rating_by_week_by_version: same as this feature in Section 4.5.

8. num_helpfulness: the more helpfulness, the more useful comments an app has, because a large number of useful comments indicates a large portion of benign users.

9. total_rater: identical to this feature in Section 4.5 and 4.5.

10. poisson_first_peak: most apps have one peak of number of downloads during the first few weeks. However, if this peak occurs later, this app becomes suspicious.

Feature Analysis. When we put feature ranking from those three countries together, we are able to find both similarities and differences. In this section, we will dive into those feature and analyze those similarities and differences.

Similarities: Even though we create training sets from each dataset separately, we still find that some features always rank higher than others, which means those features play significant roles in abused app detection. The followings are the common features.

1. High values of num_pos_reviewer, perc_pos_reviewer, num_extr_pos_reviewer and perc_extr_pos_reviewer strongly indicate the existence of malicious users and collusion group. And this can be seen from all three datasets. This also confirms our analysis in Section 2.2 that to effectively manipulate an app's average rating, malicious users tend to give 5 star, or at least 4 star and their group size should be large enough so that their rating could go against the rest of benign users.

2. As we suggest in theorem 2, only with large number of total_rater (ranks 9 in iTunes US app store, 5 in iTunes China app store, 9 in iTunes UK app store), we could possibly label those apps as abused ones. If number of total_rater of one app is too small, we lose our confidence in estimating app's true quality, therefore we shall label this app as normal app.

3. Correlation coefficient related features, such as coef_1_5_rating_by_week, etc. and variance related features, such as var_num_rating_by_week, etc. rank in top 15 in each country. Outlier values of these features directly indicate the existence of collusion groups, as by definition, members of collusion group manipulate average rating during a short period of time in order to effectively change average rating and reduce financial cost.

4. Helpfulness related features are important in abused app detection. Normal users will read the comments and possibly leave some feedbacks, while malicious users tend to publish new reviews in order to manipulate the average ratings.

Differences: Differences seem very obvious. Each dataset has its own data and we create different training sets from each of them. Therefore, feature rankings are different. But feature num_dev draws our attention. As we described in Section 3.2, num_dev is the number of applications that a developer develops. Big companies such as Google, Gameloft, EA, have published many apps. Therefore they have higher values of num_dev.

However, this feature is critical only in US and UK iTunes stores but it ranks the 43rd in China app store. Our guess is that in US and UK app stores, it is more likely that small companies abuse their apps instead of big companies; in China app store, even some big technology companies manipulate their apps’ average ratings. This guess is confirmed by our abused app data.
in the training set as we found several abused apps are developed by biggest technology companies in China.

5. Testing

5.1. Performance Metrics

For every machine learning problem, the ultimate goals are:

1. High precision and recall for training set.
2. Accurate prediction in out-of-sample data.

Usually item 1 is reasonable to reach if the training model is good enough. But item 2 is relatively difficult due to the lack of out-of-sample data. Sometimes, even if we do have out-of-sample data, evaluation is still impossible as, for supervised learning, those data are not labeled. In this specific training problem, our goals are:

1. while pushing precision and recall, precision is supposed to be better than recall. Precision is defined as

\[
\text{precision} = \frac{\sum \text{true}_\text{positive}}{\sum \text{test\_outcome\_positive}}.
\]

In this problem, precision indicates the confidence on classified abused apps. Recall is defined as

\[
\text{recall} = \frac{\sum \text{true}_\text{positive}}{\sum \text{total}_\text{positive}}.
\]

In this problem, recall indicates coverage of our results. Usually, higher precision will lead to lower recall, and vice versa [29]. For abused app detection, we emphasize on higher precision since we want to make sure we minimize the probability of labeling benign apps as abused apps and we may tolerate missing several abused apps.

2. narrowing down the scope of abused app detection instead of declaring abused apps. For app market providers, labeling an abused app is very serious and sensitive and it always involves business level decisions. We hope that our machine learning results could help app market providers narrow down the scope of investigation – only have to inspect abused apps we classify.

5.2. Results

Figure 8 depicts that the precision, recall and f-score vary from top 10 features to top 55 features (all features) in iTunes US app store. We have the following observations:

1. Generally, as we increase the number of top features, precision increases slowly while recall and f-score decrease relatively fast.
2. Precision is always better than recall, which meets our requirement.
3. When \( n = 18 \), both f-score and recall reach their peaks.

Figure 9 and Figure 10 are our evaluations for iTunes China app store and iTunes UK app store, respectively.
Even though the plot is very spiky for iTunes China app store, we still have the same observations for both UK and China app stores as for US app store. For Figure 10, even though f-score($n = 10$) is slightly better than f-score($n = 15$), we are still willing to choose the latter one as we refer high precision to high recall. Therefore, from both figures, we choose top 25 features for iTunes China app store and top 14 features for iTunes UK app store.

Table 3 summarizes our results.

After we get our final training models $h$ for each app store, we can use these training model to classify apps in residual data. We call the newly found ‘abused app’ as suspicious app as we have no evidence to prove those apps are abused ones. Table 4 summarizes our results. From the table we can see that our coverage in iTunes UK is relatively larger than other app stores with 9.51% apps labelled as abused app (suspicious) while the other two stores have around 5% suspicious apps. These observations are however specific to the datasets we use.

Classification Result Validation. The question may be asked after we label some abused(suspicious) apps in residual data is that how to validate those apps or how suspicious those apps could be. Though direct validation is difficult as we have no evidence to show if those apps are abused or not, here, we present two additional features to evaluate our results.

Consecutive Reviewer IDs: In Section 2.3, we point out that some abused apps may contain consecutive IDs. Here we define consecutive user IDs as if two IDs rate one app in the same day and the difference between IDs is less than 1000.

Figure 11, 12 and 13 depict the situations of existence of consecutive IDs in iTunes US, iTunes China and iTunes UK app stores, respectively. In each figure, x-axis represents the coverage of consecutive IDs, which is defined as percentage of consecutive user IDs over number of users who leave comments for this app. For instance, ‘<10%’ means that coverage of consecutive IDs is less than 10%. Y-axis represents the percentage of those apps over the number of apps in residual data. In the legend, ‘suspicious’ refers to the abused apps we classified by our training model; ‘abused’ refers to the abused app in our training set; ‘benign’ means the normal apps in our training data.

We can easily see that some apps contain more consecutive user IDs than normal apps do. This is because when we are picking abused apps for our training set, the algorithm we use will explicitly find collusion groups that have attacked more than one apps. It is conceivable that attackers will use same fake user IDs to launch another attack, which is much easier and more feasible than finding the same group of real users to attack another app. A group of fake users often have consecutive IDs, so those abused apps attacked by fake users can be more easily detected by our algorithm and put them into our training set and those abused apps attacked by real users remain undetected and discovered by our training models later.

Put these three figures together, we discover that, in iTunes US and UK, most abused apps are attacked by indirect formation groups, while in iTunes China, we are safe to draw conclusion that more than 50% of abused apps are attacked by direct formation groups (defined in Section 2.3).

Review Density: Another feature we use to evaluate our classification results is review density, which is the percentage of review area. Figure 14 is the number of
Table 3. Training Model Evaluation Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>App Store</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>F-score</th>
<th>Top n Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iTunes US</td>
<td>91.43%</td>
<td>72.38%</td>
<td>80.52%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTunes China</td>
<td>88.82%</td>
<td>82.94%</td>
<td>85.58%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTunes UK</td>
<td>85.37%</td>
<td>80.28%</td>
<td>82.27%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Classified Suspicious Apps In Each App Store

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>App Store</th>
<th># Suspicious Apps</th>
<th># Residual Apps</th>
<th>Coverage(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iTunes US</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>22703</td>
<td>4.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTunes China</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>21056</td>
<td>5.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iTunes UK</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>9777</td>
<td>9.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

reviews vs. week, where blue area is defined as review area and total area is represented by the square.

Figure 14. Review Density Example

Usually, abused apps should have low review density. However, we notice that most apps, no matter they are benign or abused, will gain lots of reviews in the first several weeks. That is because usually app stores will put new apps in a specific section in the front page so that users may be able to notice them. To mitigate this issue, we remove the first 5 weeks data for each app.

Figure 15. Review Density for iTunes US, China, UK App Store

Figure 15 depicts box plots of review density for iTunes US, China and UK app stores. We can see that, compared with benign apps, abused apps usually have lower review density. The suspicious apps that we classified have similar review density distribution to that of abused apps. Review densities of benign apps in China and UK are higher than those in US, which means US benign apps’ review distributions are less spiky, in general.

There are some outliers in both suspicious and abused apps, whose review densities are relatively large. Nevertheless, it is superficial to say these outliers are false positive. As we cut out the first 5-week data for each app, there might be attacking behavior hidden in the first 5 weeks, which will greatly reduce the review density if we put those data back. Another possible case is, if abused apps are successfully promoted, users will easily find these apps in app store, which leads to many reviews.

We also randomly picked some suspicious apps we found and manually investigated their rating distributions. Even theoretically, it is very difficult for human being to process those large amount of data and find useful information from it, we did notice some skeptical data and figure 16 depicts one of them.

Figure 16. Suspicious App (app ID: 593313544)
6. Data Analysis

We have done some data analysis during our training and result evaluation, but it is worth analyzing the data we have from different perspectives.

Categories of Abused App. Figure 17 depicts the percentage of apps of each category in three app stores. Note that abused apps here include abused apps in our training set and suspicious apps classified by our training models.

![Figure 17. iTunes Abused Apps Categories](image)

Though we use different training sets to train our models, in different countries, game apps are more likely to be abused than any other categories. In iTunes US and UK app store, game apps take up more than 70% and 50%, respectively. Either because there are more games than other apps or games in iTunes app store always draw more attention than any other categories simply because games have more varieties and many users would like to explore new games and spend money on them. In this case, promoting a game app could attract more users’ attention than promoting a sport app. In China, more (in terms of percentage) lifestyle apps are abused. It might be because many coupon companies and e-commerce companies are competing for market shares.

6.1. Review Content Analysis

If collusion groups focus on manipulating average scores, to reduce the cost, malicious users usually leave simple and short reviews. Abused apps here include both abused apps in the training set and suspicious apps we classified with our training model. Benign apps are the rest of apps. Figure 18 depicts the average length(number of tokens) of review contents for abused apps and benign apps in iTunes US, UK and China app stores. The method used to calculate review length is to tokenize each review content and title without punctuation. For English, number of tokens is number of words, while for Chinese, it is the number of characters. Some comments contain several languages, but with Lucene's help, our tool is still able to count the number of tokens correctly.

![Figure 18. Average Review Content Lenght in iTunes US, UK and China App Store](image)

We have the following three takeaways from this figure:

1. US and UK users tend to write longer reviews than users in China. Even English and Chinese are quite different, by manually inspecting review contents, we found that US and UK users tend to describe the apps they purchased in great detail and share more personal experience. But China users tend to give a brief judgment and usually do not share user experience.

2. In iTunes US and UK app stores, compared with benign apps, the average length (number of tokens) of comments for abused apps is nearly half of that for benign apps, which means malicious users do tend to leave simple and short comments.

3. In iTunes China app store, we can see that the average lengths are same for both of abused and benign apps. That's because even benign users in China leave short and simple reviews.

We also calculate the average review lengths of each star in these three app stores. By inspecting Figures 19, 20 and 21, we have the following observations:

1. The average review lengths of higher rating levels (4 and 5 stars) are lower than those of lower rating levels(1 and 2 stars). The higher rating level, the shorter its reviews are. This is because the higher rating apps get, the less bugs they have and users usually use more words to complain and report bugs in lower level reviews.

2. For iTunes US and UK app stores, average review lengths for abused apps are always lower than...
benign apps. Our explanation is that there are some app-promoting websites\(^2\) and apps\(^3\) are made for recruiting users to review apps and pay them. Intuitively, if users are paid to review an app, their reviews’ quality usually is low, which means review contents are short, simple, sometimes meaningless. Those websites do not require users to leave high ratings, therefore, we can see that the average lengths of each rating level for abused apps are always lower. However, this observation does not fit iTunes China app store. First of all, we have not found any similar app-promoting websites in China. Secondly, those websites use Paypal to refund users, but Paypal is not popular in China. Therefore, we think users in China may find difficulty to get paid from those websites.

### Related Work

Fake reviews or review spams in traditional online stores like Amazon, Yelp have been studied a lot. Jindal et al. [31] investigated fake reviews based on three typical ones: untruthful opinions which aim at misleading other users deliberately, reviews on brand only instead of on product quality and non-reviews including advertisement, questions, etc. Later, they further proposed an approach [32] to identify atypical review patterns by way of finding unexpected rules and rule group. Li et al. [33] used machine learning techniques and semi-supervised method, on the basis of manually labeled fake reviews, to detect unlabeled fake reviews. Ott et al. [34] emphasized psycholinguistic methods and text analysis. Their approach takes standard word and part of speech as the training data for supervised learning. These researches focus on discovering individual fake reviews in traditional market.

However, in app store, since most reviews are short, it is difficult to differentiate whether a single review is faked or not. Moreover, individual attack to an app will not work considering the large number of reviews toward a single app.

Xie and Zhu [35] studied the underground market of trading mobile app reviews and proposed an abused app tracer, which starts from known abused app set and detects related unknown abused apps by following commonly reviewed apps and shared reviewers in an iterative way. In [36], the authors proposed an approach to identifying attackers of collusive promotion groups in an app store. Different from our work, their idea is to exploit the abnormal change of app rankings to identify promoted apps, and measures their pairwise similarity to finally identifies the collusive group members,

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\(^2\)https://promodispenser.com/, https://giftmeapps.com/, etc.
\(^3\)https://itunes.apple.com/app/id688637547?mt=8
assuming multiple promoted apps have similar ranking change patterns. Our dataset does not have app daily ranking change information.

In [13], Xie and Zhu proposed a collusion group detection algorithm named GroupTie, which measures the tie strength (similarity) of raters based on their common rating behavior. The more apps two raters have commonly rated and the more similar their ratings are, the more likely they belong to the same collusion group. They build a relation graph named tie graph and detect collusion groups by applying graph clustering. In [37], the authors proposed a system called PAdetective to detect miscreants who are likely to be conducting promotional attacks. PAdetective adopts supervised learning to characterize promotion attackers with 15 features (e.g., day intervals, semantic similarity), and then applies the trained model to detect other attackers. The differences between our work and PAdetective are two-fold. First, PAdetective is designed to detect attackers whereas our approach is to detect promoted apps. Second, PAdetective uses more user features whereas our approach uses more app features.

8. Conclusion And Future Work

In this paper, we proposed a machine learning based approach to detecting app rating manipulation. We extracted 55 features from our data and use random forest algorithm to rank their importance, so that we are able to figure out which features are critical in abused app detection. It turned out that the feature rankings we get match our definitions and characteristics of abused app and collusion group, which means our features can be used to separate abused apps from benign apps well. To improve training performance in terms of speed and accuracy, we selected top $n$ features for each app store and applied our trained models to the data that we crawled but are not used during the learning procedure, in order to discover more abused apps. Even though we lack evidences to prove that average ratings of the newly discovered abused apps have been manipulated, by using two more features (consecutive user IDs and review density), it is reasonable to believe that our training models have practical merits.

Our future work includes the following.

1. Use unsupervised learning[38] to detect collusion groups. Since we found that app rating manipulation is always done by large number of malicious users in a relatively short period of time, unsupervised learning is able to divide all reviews into different clusters. Therefore, we may find useful information from those clusters.

2. Nature language processing could be introduced to analyze the review contents. We could use sentimental analysis to judge if reviewer’s comment matches its rating score, which might be a good way to classify review as malicious one or benign one. Also, by removing stop words, we will be able to analyze important word frequencies and other stuffs. Although some researchers have done similar researches before[34][39][31], analyzing review contents along is less convincing.

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References

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